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JUDGE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO SEVER TWO COUNTS IN AN INDICTMENT AND REMOVE THE MATTER, INVOLVING A JUVENILE, TO FAMILY COURT; THE PEOPLE’S ARTICLE 78 SEEKING PROHIBITION DENIED AND DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department denied the People’s Article 78 action seeking to vacate an order by the respondent judge severing two counts which had been combined in an indictment and removing the charges to Family Court. The People objected to removing the prosecution of a 16-year-old to Family Court. In order the facilitate the removal, respondent judge severed the two counts. The People unsuccessfully argued the judged did not have the authority to sever the counts, and therefore could not send the charges to Family Court:

“[T]he extraordinary remedy of prohibition lies only where there is a clear legal right, and only when a court . . . acts or threatens to act either without jurisdiction or in excess of its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction” … . “Use of the writ is, and must be, restricted so as to prevent incessant interruption of pending judicial proceedings by those seeking collateral review of adverse determinations made during the course of those proceedings” … .

There is no merit in the People’s contention that the court lacks the authority to sever charges that were joined in a single indictment. This argument would have validity in cases where charges were properly joinable in a single indictment. However, the law is clear that the determination of whether the charges were, in fact, properly joinable in the first instance, is a duty of the court that is not delegated to the prosecution or the grand jury.

The court has a duty to examine the indictment to determine whether joinder is proper pursuant to CPL 200.20(a) or (b). Notably, the People have not provided any precedent to support their position to the contrary. Courts routinely rule on the issue of whether charges in an indictment are properly joinable under CPL 200.20(2) and sever those charges that are not … .

While the People disagree with the court’s finding that the … charges were not properly joinable under CPL 200.20(2)(b), determination of this issue is not before us in this article 78 proceeding. Rather, we are only asked, and we only have the authority, to determine whether the court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its authority. Matter of Vance v Roberts, 2019 NY Slip Op 07358, First Dept 10-10-19

 

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