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COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE EAVESDROPPING WARRANTS TO INTERCEPT CELL PHONE CALLS AND TEXT MESSAGES SENT AND RECEIVED OUTSIDE NEW YORK STATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue eavesdropping warrants to intercept cell phone calls and text messages made and received outside New York State:

“[A]ny justice of the supreme court of the judicial district in which the eavesdropping warrant is to be executed” (CPL 700.05[4]) “may issue an eavesdropping warrant . . . upon ex parte application of an applicant who is authorized by law to investigate, prosecute or participate in the prosecution of the particular designated offense which is the subject of the application” (CPL 700.10[1]). Although the word “execute” is not defined in CPL article 700, the plain meaning of the word “execute” and the use of that word in relevant sections of the Criminal Procedure Law reveal that an eavesdropping warrant is “executed” when a communication is intercepted by law enforcement officers, that is, when the communication is “intentionally overheard or recorded” by law enforcement officers (CPL 700.05[3][a]; see CPL 700.35[1]). Here, the eavesdropping warrants were executed in Kings County, New York, where the communications were intercepted by the New York City Police Department … . Therefore, under the applicable provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law, a Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County, had jurisdiction to issue the eavesdropping warrants.

Moreover, we reject the defendant’s argument that the eavesdropping warrants, which were authorized for the purpose of investigating crimes that were occurring in New York, constituted an unconstitutional extraterritorial application of New York State law … . People v Schneider, 2019 NY Slip Op 07424, Second Dept 10-16-19

 

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