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MORTGAGE WAS NOT ACCELERATED UNTIL THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS COMMENCED IN OCTOBER 2016; ACTION FOR THE INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS MISSED DURING THE SIX YEARS PRIOR TO OCTOBER 2016 IS TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the mortgage was not accelerated until the foreclosure action was commenced in October, 2016. Therefore the action was not time-barred, except for the mortgages payments due but not paid more than six years prior to October 2016 (missed payments prior to October 2010):

… [C]ontrary to the defendant’s contention, he did not establish that the complaint should be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds through the notices sent to the defendant in February 2009 and May 2009, as those notices did not accelerate the mortgage. The notices indicated that acceleration was a possible future event, but did not constitute an exercise of the mortgage’s acceleration clause … . Rather, the mortgage was only accelerated in October 2016, when the plaintiff served the foreclosure complaint on the defendant seeking immediate payment of the balance of the principal indebtedness. Thus, the Supreme Court should not have granted dismissal of the complaint in its entirety as time-barred. Specifically, the defendant failed to show that the causes of action in the complaint, insofar as they relate to unpaid mortgage installments which accrued within the six-year period immediately preceding the plaintiff’s October 2016 commencement of this foreclosure action, to wit, the unpaid installments which accrued on or after October 6, 2010, were time-barred … .

However, where, as here, the mortgage was payable in installments, there are “separate causes of action for each installment accrued, and the Statute of Limitations [begins] to run, on the date each installment [becomes] due” … . Therefore, since the plaintiff alleged that the defendant made his last payment on mortgage in January 2009 and this action was not commenced until October 6, 2016, the defendant established that any unpaid installments of the mortgage which accrued before the six-year period prior to the plaintiff’s commencement of this mortgage foreclosure action, to wit, unpaid installments from January 2009 through October 5, 2010, are time-barred … . Ditech Fin., LLC v Reiss, 2019 NY Slip Op 06208, Second Dept 8-21-19

 

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