You are here: / / CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS FRAUDULENT PURSUANT...
, ,

CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE AS FRAUDULENT PURSUANT TO THE DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW; RELATED AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES BASED UPON UNSUPPORTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined conveyances of property should have been set aside as fraudulent and the related affirmative defenses based upon unsupported conclusions of law should have been dismissed:

… [T]he plaintiff submitted … a copy of the deed and transfer documents regarding the properties at issue, which demonstrated that conveyances of the properties were made after the underlying action was commenced and without fair consideration. The plaintiff also submitted evidence that a judgment was docketed against [defendants] and that they failed to satisfy the judgment. With respect to the element of fair consideration, the deed and transfer documents reflect that no money or a nominal fee of ten dollars was paid for the defendants’ properties. Therefore, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the first cause of action to the extent that it seeks to set aside the conveyances of the properties pursuant to former section 273-a of the Debtor and Creditor Law … . …

The Supreme Court … should have granted that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss the affirmative defenses insofar as the affirmative defenses pertain to Debtor and Creditor Law former § 273-a. CPLR 3211(b) authorizes a plaintiff to move to dismiss a defendant’s affirmative defense on the ground that it is without merit … [T]he affirmative defenses … proffered no supporting facts and merely pleaded conclusions of law. Diaz v 297 Schaefer St. Realty Corp., 2021 NY Slip Op 03825, Second Dept 6-16-21

 

You might also like
EXCEPTION TO THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY AFTER THE UNDERLYING ACTION WAS SETTLED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​
CONTRACTUAL PROVISION LIMITING DAMAGES IS ENFORCEABLE, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
PETITIONER WAS 14 IN 1990 WHEN HE MURDERED A CLASSMATE AND THE CHILD SHE WAS BABYSITTING, THE PAROLE BOARD PROPERLY DENIED PAROLE FOR THE FIFTH TIME, THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THE BOARD CONSIDERED ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS AND DID NOT BASE THEIR DECISION SOLELY ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS HAD STANDING TO BRING A COMMON-LAW ACTION TO ENJOIN ZONING VIOLATIONS BY VIRTUE OF THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF PLAINTIFFS’ AND DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTIES.
WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.
ALTHOUGH DISFAVORED, DISCLOSURE OF REDACTED TAX RETURNS WAS WARRANTED IN THIS CASE (FIRST DEPT).
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL HAD NOTIFIED ALL PARTIES HE WAS NO LONGER REPRESENTING PLAINTIFF, THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF AN ATTORNEY OF RECORD HAD NOT BEEN FOLLOWED, THEREFORE THE STIPULATION OF DISCONTINUANCE SIGNED BY PLAINTIFF PRO SE WAS NOT VALID.
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE APPOINTED MOTHER GUARDIAN OF THE JUVENILE, DISPENSED WITH SERVICE ON FATHER, AND MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE JUVENILE TO APPLY FOR SPECIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRATION STATUS (SJIS); ALL OF THE COMPLICATED, INTERTWINED STATUTORY LAW EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF RECEIVED THE FULL BENEFIT OF A LOAN AGREEMENT; THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE... BECAUSE THE STATE, NOT THE TOWN, OWNS THE LAND BENEATH THE LAKE, THE TOWN DID...