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JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, GRANTED A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THIS TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASE, CORPORATE OFFICERS PROPERLY SUED IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined that defendants’ motion to dismiss the trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition causes of action was properly denied. The court noted that the complaint properly alleged torts by defendants in their individual capacities without alleging facts supporting piercing the corporate veil. The Second Department held that the judge, sua sponte, should not have granted the preliminary injunction:

” [P]reliminary injunctive relief is a drastic remedy which will not be granted unless a clear right thereto is established under the law and the undisputed facts upon the moving papers, and the burden of showing an undisputed right rests upon the movant'” … . “As a general rule, the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” … . “In exercising that discretion, the Supreme Court must determine if the moving party has established: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, and (3) a balance of the equities in favor of the injunction” … . ” [A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, a preliminary injunction will not issue where to do so would grant the movant the ultimate relief to which he or she would be entitled in a final judgment'” … .

The plaintiff did not request a preliminary injunction  … [T]he record in this case lacks evidence establishing, among other things, irreparable harm or extraordinary circumstances warranting a preliminary injunction that would, in effect, depart from the status quo and grant the plaintiff its ultimate relief … . The evidence at this stage further fails to demonstrate that the plaintiff possesses a likelihood of success on the merits … . The court therefore improvidently exercised its discretion in sua sponte awarding preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiff. Emanuel Mizrahi, DDS, P.C. v Angela Andretta, DMD, P.C., 2019 NY Slip Op 02315, Second Dept 3-27-19

 

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