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BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank did not demonstrate compliance with the notice provisions of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) in this foreclosure action. Therefore defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted:

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The plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or any proof of mailing by the post office demonstrating that it properly served the defendant pursuant to the terms of the statute … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the affidavit of a vice president for loan documentation of the loan servicer was insufficient to establish that the notice was sent to the defendant in the manner required by RPAPL 1304, as the loan servicer did not provide proof of a standard office mailing procedure and provided no independent proof of the actual mailing … .

The Supreme Court erred in denying the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him based upon the plaintiff’s failure to comply with RPAPL 1304. The defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him, submitting, inter alia, his own affidavit attesting that he did not receive any notice pursuant to RPAPL 1304 … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Henry, 2018 NY Slip Op 00326, Second Dept 1-17-18

FORECLOSURE (BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE PROVISIONS OF RPAPL 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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