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NONPARTY LAW FIRM SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS BASED UPON DEFENDANTS’ FAILURE TO PAY REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND FAILURE TO COOPERATE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the nonparty law firm, Kaufman, should have been allowed to withdraw as counsel for defendants T & V and Komninos based upon defendant’s failure to pay attorney’s fees and failure to cooperate:

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the law firm’s unopposed motion for leave to withdraw as counsel for T & V and Komninos. An attorney may be permitted to withdraw from employment where a client refuses to pay reasonable legal fees (see Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.16[c][5] … ). Likewise, an attorney may withdraw from representing a client if the client “fails to cooperate in the representation or otherwise renders the representation unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out employment effectively” (Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.16[c][7] … ).

Here, the law firm established that T & V and Komninos failed in their obligation to pay the legal fees earned by the law firm and further failed to cooperate in their representation. Moreover, T & V and Komninos did not oppose that branch of the law firm’s motion which was for leave to withdraw as their counsel. Accordingly, that branch of the motion which was for leave to withdraw as counsel for T & V and Komninos should have been granted … . Villata v Kokkinos, 2019 NY Slip Op 02143, Second Dept 3-20-19

 

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