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Voluntary Firefighter Should Not Have Been Suspended Without a Hearing Pursuant to the General Municipal Law

The Second Department determined a voluntary firefighter was entitled to a hearing pursuant to the General Municipal Law.  The firefighter was suspended (without a hearing) for six months for acting in a disorderly manner in an a manner unbecoming a member of the fire department:

…[T]here is no merit to the appellants’ contention that they did not have to comply with the hearing requirements of General Municipal Law § 209-l because this matter did not involve the petitioner’s “removal” from the Fire Company. Subsection (3) of General Municipal Law § 209-l provides that:

“[r]emovals on the ground of incompetence or misconduct, except for absenteeism at fires or meetings, shall be made only after a hearing upon due notice and upon stated charges and with the right to such officer or member to a review pursuant to article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules. Such charges shall be in writing and may be made by any such authority. The burden of proving incompetency or misconduct shall be upon the person alleging the same.”

“[A] volunteer firefighter must be afforded due process in disciplinary proceedings” … . This is true whether the penalty that is ultimately imposed entails the firefighter’s permanent removal from his or her position, or a suspension from the position. As set forth in General Municipal Law § 209-l(5), “[t];he officer or body having the power to remove the person charged with incompetence or misconduct may suspend such person after charges are filed and pending disposition of the charges, and after the hearing may remove such person or may suspend him or her for a period of time not to exceed one year” (emphasis added). The plain meaning of this provision is that a volunteer firefighter may only be temporarily suspended, without a hearing, from the time that the charges are filed until the ultimate disposition of the charges, but that a hearing is required to actually dispose of the charges, and that a final penalty of suspension, not to exceed one year, may only be imposed after that hearing. Consequently, the appellants were required to comply with the procedures set forth in General Municipal Law § 209-l … . Matter of McEvoy v Oyster Bay Fire Co No 1, 2014 NY Slip Op 03688, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

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