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THE COUNTY CHARTER PROVISION PROHIBITING SERVICE AS A COUNTY LEGISLATOR “FOR MORE THAN 12 CONSECUTIVE YEARS” DOES NOT PRECLUDE A NEW TERM THAT IS NOT CONSECUTIVE TO THE PRECEDING TERM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the provision of the Suffolk County Charter which prohibits serving as a county legislature “for more than 12 consecutive years” did not preclude petitioner from running for a new term that was not consecutive to the preceding term:

“[T]he plain language of the statute . . . is the clearest indication of legislative intent” … .Here, the relevant provision of the Suffolk County Charter states that “[n]o person shall serve as a County Legislator for more than 12 consecutive years” (Suffolk County Charter art II, § C2-5[B]). This provision does not expressly impose any total or lifetime term limit. Further, the plain language of the provision only prohibits a County Legislator from serving more than 12 consecutive years. In construing a statute, “words must be ‘harmonize[d]’ and read together to avoid surplusage” … . Therefore, the provision should not be interpreted as prohibiting an individual who has previously served as a County Legislator for 12 consecutive years from thereafter seeking a new term in that office, so long as the new term sought is not consecutive to the preceding term … . Matter of Doyle v Browning, 2021 NY Slip Op 02838, Second Dept 5-5-21

 

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