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THE EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE IN THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE PROVISION WHICH CRIMINALIZES POSSESSION OF AMMUNITION IS AN EXCEPTION THAT MUST BE AFFIRMATIVELY PLED, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of ammunition pursuant to New York City Administrative Code § 10-131(i)(3), determined that the exclusionary language in the code provision is an exception which must be affirmatively pled in the accusatory instrument:

We find that the relevant language in section 10-131(i)(3), which makes it a crime to possess pistol or revolver ammunition unless authorized to possess a pistol or revolver, constitutes an exception and not a proviso. Consequently, it was the People’s burden to prove that the defendant was not authorized to possess a pistol or revolver within the City of New York. As the People failed to do so, defendant’s conviction under section 10-131(i)(3) must be vacated and that count dismissed.

In order to determine whether a statute defining a crime contains “an exception that must be affirmatively pleaded as an element in the accusatory instrument” or “a proviso that need not be pleaded but may be raised by the accused as a bar to prosecution or a defense at trial,” one must look to the language of the statute itself … . Indeed, “[i]f the defining statute contains an exception, the indictment must allege that the crime is not within the exception. But when the exception is found outside the statute,” it is termed a proviso and “generally is a matter for the defendant to raise in defense” … . “Legislative intent to create an exception [whose existence must be negated by the prosecution] has generally been found when the language of exclusion is contained entirely within” the statute itself … . In contrast, where the language of the exclusion depends on a source outside the statute, courts will infer that the language functions as a proviso … . People v Tatis, 2019 NY Slip Op 01507, First Dept 2-28-19

 

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