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PRO SE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS ORDER OF PROTECTION PROCEEDING.

The First Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court should have informed pro se petitioner of his right to counsel in this order of protection proceeding:

Family Court committed reversible error when, during a brief hearing in this article 8 proceeding, it failed to advise the pro se petitioner that he had a right to the assistance of counsel of his own choosing, a right to an adjournment to confer with counsel, and a right to have counsel assigned if he was financially unable to obtain representation (Family Ct Act § 262[a][ii]…). Moreover, Family Court did not possess sufficient relevant information to allow it to make an informed determination as to whether the parties are or have been in an “intimate relationship” within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) … . Further evidence is needed regarding the frequency of petitioner and respondent’s interactions … . Matter of Gustavo D. v Michael D., 2017 NY Slip Op 00246, 1st Dept 1-12-17

FAMILY LAW (PRO SE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS ORDER OF PROTECTION PROCEEDING)/ATTORNEYS (FAMILY LAW, PRO SE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS ORDER OF PROTECTION PROCEEDING)/ORDER OF PROTECTION (FAMILY LAW, PRO SE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THIS ORDER OF PROTECTION PROCEEDING)

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