You are here: / / THERE WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY...
, ,

THERE WAS NO PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, DEFENSE VERDICT FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUFFER A SERIOUS INJURY WAS NECESSARILY BASED ON THE DEFENSE EXPERT’S TESTIMONY, VERDICT WAS PROPERLY SET ASIDE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict in this traffic accident case was properly granted. Plaintiff had been granted summary judgment on liability and proceeded to trial on damages. Defendants’ expert, McGowan, purported to analyze the forces involved in the collision and opined that the impact could not have caused plaintiff’s injuries. The jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff did not suffer a “serious injury:”

… [W]e agree with the Supreme Court’s determination to grant the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of damages… . “An expert’s opinion must be based on facts in the record or personally known to the witness'”… . Here, a proper foundation was lacking for the admission of McGowan’s opinion … . Among other things, McGowan failed to calculate the force exerted by all four vehicles, the crash test he utilized to determine the delta-v differed in several significant respects from the instant accident, and he reviewed simulations in which the weight of the dummies was not similar to that of the plaintiff. Imran v R. Barany Monuments, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 08921, Second Dept 12-26-18

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE CORD WHICH ALLEGEDLY CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL MAY HAVE BEEN OPEN AND OBVIOUS, DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS NOT INHERENTLY DANGEROUS; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
COURT’S LIMITED POWER TO REVIEW AN ARBITRATION AWARD SUCCINCTLY STATED.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF ELEVATED WHEEL STOP IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, A PARTY WHO DID NOT SIGN THE NOTE BUT DID SIGN THE MORTGAGE IS A “BORROWER” ENTITLED TO RPAPL 1304 NOTICE; PLAINTIFF BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE EVIDENCE IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT AS ONE OF THE ROBBERS WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT BUT DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (SECOND DEPT).
COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, ISSUE NOT RAISED BELOW PROPERLY CONSIDERED ON APPEAL.
Criteria for Preemption by Martin Act
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH OF AN APARTMENT DEPENDED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, A DARDEN HEARING WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY, MATTER REMITTED FOR THE HEARING (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE WAS SUPPORTED BY A SWORN DENIAL... MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE THE ADMINISTRATRIX OF PLAINTIFF’S ESTATE FOR THE...