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DISCLOSURE OF WITNESS CONTACT INFORMATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DELAYED UNTIL 15 DAYS BEFORE TRIAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined disclosure of contact information re: the complainant’s mother and two 911 callers must be delayed until 15 days before trial:

Where, as here, “the issue involves balancing the defendant’s interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for witness safety and protection, the question is appropriately framed as whether the determination made by the trial court was a provident exercise of discretion” … .

Applying the factors set forth in CPL 245.70(4), including concerns for witness safety and protection, I conclude that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in directing immediate disclosure of the subject materials to counsel for the defendant, counsel’s investigator, and the defendant. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have delayed disclosure of the address and contact information of the complainant, and of the name, address, and contact information of the complainant’s mother and the individuals identified as the first and second 911 callers … . People v Harper. 2020 NY Slip Op 02193, Second Dept 4-2-20

 

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