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CONVICTION AFFIRMED BUT STRONG DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WORE THE SAME PRISON-ISSUE CLOTHES FOR EIGHT DAYS (SECOND DEPT

The Second Department, over a detailed and comprehensive dissent (worth reading), affirmed defendant’s attempted murder conviction. The dissent made it clear there was a strong right to counsel issue that, because it involved facts that are not on the record, must be brought in a motion to vacate the conviction. The dissent also argued defendant was deprived of a fair trial because he appeared in the same prison-issue clothes for eight days:

From the Dissent:

Since the Supreme Court was informed at the time of arraignment in Queens County that the defendant had established an attorney-client relationship with Eaddy in both the Kings County and Queens County cases, it was incumbent upon the court to assign her as counsel unless she was not ready, willing, or able to accept the assignment… . At the time of arraignment, there was no risk that Eaddy’s participation would have delayed or disrupted the proceedings, created any conflict of interest, or resulted in prejudice to the prosecution or the defense. To the contrary, Eaddy’s familiarity with the defendant and the case, as well as the defendant’s preference for her as his assigned counsel, would most likely have expedited matters. Indeed, the attorney who was assigned to represent the defendant at the arraignment, Siff, was eventually discharged in March 2011 and replaced with Coppin, with whom the defendant expressed dissatisfaction and requested further substitution.

Instead of inquiring as to Eaddy’s availability at the time of arraignment, the Supreme Court summarily denied the defendant’s request for the constitutionally impermissible reason that the defendant was too indigent to pay for her services  … . * * *

Here, there is no question that the clothing worn by the defendant was prison-issued clothing. The defendant wore the same green top and bottom for three days of jury selection and more than five days of trial testimony. Even the Supreme Court described the defendant’s clothing as “that thing.” Based upon the description of the clothes and the fact that the defendant wore the same clothes for at least eight days, a reasonable juror could only conclude that the clothing was prison garb. Given the defendant’s objection to wearing dirty prison clothes, I conclude that he preserved his contention for appellate review, and that, as a matter of law, he was deprived of a fair trial … . People v Ellis, 2018 NY Slip Op 08143, Second Dept 11-28-18

CRIMINAL LAW (CONVICTION AFFIRMED BUT STRONG DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WORE THE SAME PRISON-ISSUE CLOTHES FOR EIGHT DAYS (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (CRIMINAL LAW, CONVICTION AFFIRMED BUT STRONG DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WORE THE SAME PRISON-ISSUE CLOTHES FOR EIGHT DAYS (SECOND DEPT))/RIGHT TO COUNSEL (CRIMINAL LAW, CONVICTION AFFIRMED BUT STRONG DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WORE THE SAME PRISON-ISSUE CLOTHES FOR EIGHT DAYS (SECOND DEPT))/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (CRIMINAL LAW, TRIALS, PRISON CLOTHES, CONVICTION AFFIRMED BUT STRONG DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WORE THE SAME PRISON-ISSUE CLOTHES FOR EIGHT DAYS (SECOND DEPT))/CLOTHES (CRIMINAL LAW, TRIALS, CONVICTION AFFIRMED BUT STRONG DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE HE WORE THE SAME PRISON-ISSUE CLOTHES FOR EIGHT DAYS (SECOND DEPT))

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