You are here: / / ALTHOUGH THE BACKHOE WHICH COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE HAD...
, ,

ALTHOUGH THE BACKHOE WHICH COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE HAD BEEN USED FOR ROADWORK THAT DAY, AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT THE BACKHOE WAS BEING USED TO TRANSPORT GRAVEL TO THE WORK SITE; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED THE BACKHOE WAS NOT “ACTIVELY ENGAGED” IN ROADWORK AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT AND, THEREFORE, THE HIGHER “RECKLESS DISREGARD” STANDARD FOR LIABILITY IN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW DID NOT APPLY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Chambers, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county employee who rear-ended the plaintiff’s vehicle with a backhoe was not engaged in road construction work within the meaning of the Vehicle and Traffic Law at the time of the accident and, therefore, was not subject to the higher “reckless disregard” standard for liability. Although the backhoe had been used to repair a road, at the time of the accident the backhoe was transporting gravel to the work site. The Second Department determined transporting gravel was did not meet the definition of being “actively engaged” in construction work:

… [W]e conclude that the defendant driver was not actually engaged in work on a highway at the time of the accident …, because the act of transporting gravel to a highway worksite does not itself constitute construction, repair, maintenance, or similar work on a highway … . When a vehicle travels on a highway to transport equipment or materials, the road itself is not being worked on; instead, the road is being used for its intended purpose of facilitating travel. Moreover, the mere transporting of materials or equipment is different in kind from acts that have been deemed to constitute work “on” a highway, such as clearing or cleaning the road or its shoulder … , or actively assessing the conditions of the road or searching for a reported hazard on the road … . …

​… [T]he defendants do not contend that the mere transporting of construction materials on a public road will in every instance constitute being actually engaged in work on a highway. Rather, in advancing their claim, the defendants contend that the defendant driver’s transport of materials fell within the scope of the statute because the defendant driver had been repairing a roadbed on the day of the collision and had not yet completed his work for the day. We disagree. The defendants’ position is inconsistent with the statute’s use of the phrase “actually engaged” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103[b]), as reflected in the plain language of the statute and its interpretation by the courts. Qosaj v Village of Sleepy Hollow, 2023 NY Slip Op 06395, Second Dept 12-13-23

Practice Point: A road-construction vehicle involved in an accident will not be subject to the higher “reckless disregard” standard of liability unless the vehicle is “actively engaged” in roadwork at the time of the accident. Transporting gravel to the work site is not considered “active engagement.”

 

You might also like
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT START PROCEEDINGS TO ENTER A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR AND DID NOT PRESENT AN ADEQUATE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY; THE MOTION TO DISIMISS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, THE PASSENGER IN PLAINTIFF’S CAR EXECUTED A RELEASE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-DRIVER; DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION FROM PLAINTIFF FOR ANY INJURY SUFFERED BY THE PASSENGER SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE OUT-OF-POSSESSION LANDLORD WAS LIABLE FOR AN ALLEGEDLY DEFECTIVE DRAINAGE SYSTEM WHICH RESULTED IN ICE ACCUMULATION. PLAINTIFF’S AFFIDAVITS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED (SECOND DEPT).
THE FEDERAL OFFENSE WHICH SERVED AS A PREDICATE FOR DEFENDANT’S SECOND-FELONY-OFFENDER DESIGNATION DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT THE FIREARM INVOLVED BE OPERABLE; THE RELEVANT NEW YORK FELONY OFFENSE INCLUDES OPERABILITY AS AN ELEMENT; THEREFORE THE FEDERAL OFFENSE IS NOT A VALID PREDICATE OFFENSE (SECOND DEPT).
JUDGE DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR THAT DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE INCLUDED A PERIOD OF POSTRELEASE SUPERVISION, PLEA VACATED AND MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THE CITY DEMONSTRATED IT DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE MOUND OF SNOW AND ICE WHERE PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY SLIPPED AND FELL, WHICH ORDINARILY WOULD SUPPORT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY; HOWEVER PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE CITY CREATED THE DANGEROUS CONDITION BY PLOWING, AN EXCEPTION TO THE WRITTEN NOTICE REQUIREMENT (SECOND DEPT).
A Defendant’s Status as an Undocumented Alien Cannot Be the Sole Ground for Imposing Incarceration As Opposed to Probation
NONE OF DEFENDANT’S CONVICTIONS STOOD UP TO APPELLATE SCRUTINY; THE GRAND LARCENY AND CRIMINAL IMPERSONATION CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; THE COUNTS CHARGING SCHEME TO DEFRAUD AND APPEARING AS AN ATTORNEY WITHOUT BEING ADMITTED WERE DISMISSED AS DUPLICITOUS (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE NOTICE TO ADMIT SOUGHT CONCESSIONS THAT WENT TO THE ESSENCE OF THE CONTROVERSY... ​PLAINTIFF’S FIRST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED...