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DEFENDANT’S FOR-CAUSE CHALLENGE TO A JUROR SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined defendant’s for-cause challenge to a prospective juror should have been granted:

… Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s for-cause challenge to a prospective juror who evinced a state of mind that was likely to preclude the prospective juror from rendering an impartial verdict based on the evidence … . “[A] prospective juror whose statements raise a serious doubt regarding the ability to be impartial must be excused unless the juror states unequivocally on the record that he or she can be fair and impartial” … . Here, during voir dire, the prospective juror stated that his mother-in-law was a victim of sexual assault and raised his hand when defense counsel asked if any potential jurors felt that this was not the “right case” for them since the sexual assault allegations in this case might make them “too emotional” and might be something they “c[ould not] handle.” Under the circumstances, the prospective juror’s statements raised a serious doubt regarding his ability to be impartial, and the court failed to elicit an unequivocal assurance on the record that the prospective juror could render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence … . Since the defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, the denial of his for-cause challenge constitutes reversible error … . People v Faustin, 2025 NY Slip Op 01231, Second Dept 3-5-25

Practice Point: The prospective juror’s statements raised serious doubts about his ability to be impartial in this sexual-offense case. Defendant’s for-cause challenge to the prospective juror should have been granted.​

 

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