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MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER WAS A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD AND THEREFORE WAS SUBJECT TO A NEGLECT FINDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the maternal grandmother met the definition of a person legally responsible for the child's (Talia's) care, against who a neglect finding can properly be made:

Child protective proceedings encompass only abuse or neglect by a person who is a parent or other person legally responsible for the child's care … . A person legally responsible is defined as “the child's custodian, guardian, [or] any other person responsible for the child's care at the relevant time” (Family Court Act § 1012[g]). “A person is a proper respondent in an article 10 proceeding as an other person legally responsible for the child's care if that person acts as the functional equivalent of a parent in a familial or household setting” … . “Determining whether a particular person has acted as the functional equivalent of a parent is a discretionary, fact-intensive inquiry which will vary according to the particular circumstances of each case. Factors such as the frequency and nature of the contact between the child and respondent, the nature and extent of the control exercised by the respondent over the child's environment, the duration of the respondent's contact with the child, and the respondent's relationship to the child's parent(s) are some of the variables which should be considered and weighed by a court” … . However, “article 10 should not be construed to include persons who assume fleeting or temporary care of a child such as a supervisor of a play-date or an overnight visitor or those persons who provide extended daily care of children in institutional settings, such as teachers” … .

Here, we agree with the Family Court's determination that the maternal grandmother was a person legally responsible for the children. The maternal grandmother came to the parents' home every day and slept over regularly, as many as two to three times per week. On the days that she did not sleep over, the maternal grandmother would come over in the morning and would stay until the paternal grandmother arrived in the afternoon. The maternal grandmother fed Talia, changed her diaper and her clothes, and, along with the mother, bathed Talia several times a week. The mother testified that the maternal grandmother took care of Talia while the mother played with Jonah, and the maternal grandmother was alone with Talia whenever the mother napped or did laundry, and that at least one to two times per week from Talia's birth until April 2014, the maternal grandmother was the only person caring for Talia. Matter of Jonah B. (Riva V.), 2018 NY Slip Op 06736, Second Dept 10-10-18

FAMILY LAW (MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER WAS A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD AND THEREFORE WAS SUBJECT TO A NEGLECT FINDING (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLECT (FAMILY LAW, MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER WAS A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD AND THEREFORE WAS SUBJECT TO A NEGLECT FINDING (SECOND DEPT))/PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF CHILD (FAMILY LAW, MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER WAS A PERSON LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF THE CHILD AND THEREFORE WAS SUBJECT TO A NEGLECT FINDING (SECOND DEPT))

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