You are here: / / THE AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD AND JUDICIARY LAW CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PRECLUDED...
, ,

THE AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD AND JUDICIARY LAW CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PRECLUDED BY THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE; THE FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ALLEGE RELIANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the aiding and abetting fraud and Judiciary Law 487 causes of action were barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (see Mine Workers v Pennington, 381 US 657; Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 US 127), and the complaint did not state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement:

“The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to petition the government for governmental action, including through litigation and activity incidental to litigation” … . …

… Supreme Court properly concluded that the causes of action alleging that the defendants aided and abetted fraud and violated Judiciary Law § 487 were barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine applied to these causes of action insofar as they were based upon litigation and activities that were incidental to litigation, and the pertinent allegations did not fit within either the “sham” or the “corruption” exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine … . …

Where a cause of action is based upon misrepresentation or fraud, “the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail” (CPLR 3016[b]). Here, the allegations in the complaint failed to sufficiently allege justifiable reliance, and therefore failed to state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement … . Louie’s Seafood Rest., LLC v Brown, 2021 NY Slip Op 06167, Second Dept 11-10-21

 

You might also like
FATHER DID NOT RECEIVE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THIS CHILD SUPPORT PROCEEDING RESULTING IN HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE MONTHS IN JAIL; NEW HEARING ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
Criteria for Prohbition and Mandamus Actions Explained
PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WAS KILLED BY A DRIVER WHO WAS BEING PURSUED BY THE POLICE; THE POLICE DEPARTMENT’S INTERNAL RULES IMPOSED A HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE FOR POLICE-CHASES THAN THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW; THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THE INTERNAL RULES COULD BE CONSIDERED ONLY AS SOME EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE; PLAINTIFF’S JUDGMENT REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
THE 2007 NOTICE OF DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THE INITIAL ACTION WAS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF STANDING AND DID NOT, THEREFORE, ACCELERATE THE DEBT (SECOND DEPT),
MOTION TO RENEW SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED AS A MOTION TO REARGUE, NEW EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PRESENTED.
PETITION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, WITHOUT PROOF, CONTENDED THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REPLACED, APPARENTLY IN ORDER TO DELAY THE PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT).
THE EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT; ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION VACATED; UNPRESERVED ISSUE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT). ​
Action for a Declaratory Judgment Must Be Based Upon a Concrete Dispute, Not the Mere Possibility of Prejudice—Complaint Properly Dismissed

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE APPLICABILITIY OF THE ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK DEFENSE... FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE RETURNED THE CHILD TO THE PARENTS’ CUSTODY...