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THE AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD AND JUDICIARY LAW CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PRECLUDED BY THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE; THE FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ALLEGE RELIANCE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the aiding and abetting fraud and Judiciary Law 487 causes of action were barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (see Mine Workers v Pennington, 381 US 657; Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 US 127), and the complaint did not state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement:

“The Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to petition the government for governmental action, including through litigation and activity incidental to litigation” … . …

… Supreme Court properly concluded that the causes of action alleging that the defendants aided and abetted fraud and violated Judiciary Law § 487 were barred by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine applied to these causes of action insofar as they were based upon litigation and activities that were incidental to litigation, and the pertinent allegations did not fit within either the “sham” or the “corruption” exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine … . …

Where a cause of action is based upon misrepresentation or fraud, “the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail” (CPLR 3016[b]). Here, the allegations in the complaint failed to sufficiently allege justifiable reliance, and therefore failed to state a cause of action for fraudulent inducement … . Louie’s Seafood Rest., LLC v Brown, 2021 NY Slip Op 06167, Second Dept 11-10-21

 

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PLAINTIFF, A HOMEOWNER WHOSE COMPANY HIRED DEFENDANT SUBCONTRACTOR TO WORK AT PLAINTIFF’S HOME, WAS A PROPER PLAINTIFF UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6), QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS IN CONTROL OF THE WORK SITE AND HAD BEEN DELEGATED SITE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES (SECOND DEPT).
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