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DEFENDANT INSURER DID NOT ELIMINATE ALL QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER PLAINTIFFS (INSUREDS) VIOLATED THE COOPERATION CLAUSE IN THE POLICY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant insurer did not eliminate all questions of fact whether the plaintiffs (insureds) violated the cooperation clause in the policy:

“An unexcused and willful refusal to comply with disclosure requirements in an insurance policy is a material breach of the cooperation clause and precludes recovery on a claim. Compliance with such a clause is a condition precedent to coverage, properly addressed by the court” … . “In order to establish breach of a cooperation clause, the insurer must show that the insured engaged in an unreasonable and willful pattern of refusing to answer material and relevant questions or to supply material and relevant documents” … .

Here, the defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiffs breached the cooperation clause of the policy. Jahangir v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 08049, Second Dept 12-30-20

 

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