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A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (SECOND DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Andrias, determined that the requirement that Bear Stearns repay $160,000,000 constituted a penalty (disgorgement) for improper profit-taking, even where the benefits went to others and not Bear Stearns,  and therefore was not a “loss” for which Bear Stearns' insurer was liable:

The law of the case is applicable to “legal determinations that were necessarily resolved on the merits in a prior decision” … . On the prior appeal, the Court of Appeals stated that “the Insurers do not earnestly dispute that the claims fall within the policy's definition of Loss” … , but did not rely on the policy language in denying defendants' motions. Instead it focused on the public policy issue. Furthermore, the doctrine does not apply where a motion for summary judgment follows a motion to dismiss that was not converted to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212(c)… .

Even if the Court of Appeals' prior determination is viewed as addressing the contractual issue, “while the law of the case doctrine is intended to foster orderly convenience' . . ., it is not an absolute mandate which limits an appellate court's power to reconsider issues where there are extraordinary circumstances, such as subsequent evidence affecting the prior determination or a change of law'” … . Here, the United States Supreme Court's decision in [Kokesh v Securities and Exchange Commission (_ US_, 137 S Ct 1635 [2017])], characterizing SEC disgorgement as a penalty, represents such a change of law. * * *… Kokesh has now provided the missing precedent, establishing that disgorgement is a penalty, whether it is linked to the wrongdoer's gains or gains that went to others. In Kokesh, the Supreme Court, emphasizing that when a sanction “can only be explained as . . . serving either retributive or deterrent purposes,” it is a “punishment,” rejected the SEC's argument that disgorgement is remedial because it simply puts the defendant back in the position “he would have occupied had he not broken the law.” J.P. Morgan Sec., Inc. v Vigilant Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 06146, First Dept 9-19-18

INSURANCE LAW (SECURITIES, A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (FIRST DEPT))/SECURITIES (INSURANCE LAW, A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (FIRST DEPT))/DISGORGEMENT (INSURANCE LAW, SECURITIES, A PENALTY OR DISGORGEMENT STEMMING FROM IMPROPER PROFIT-TAKING BY BEAR STEARNS IS NOT AN INSURABLE LOSS, EVEN IF THE BENEFITS OF THE PROFIT-TAKING WENT TO OTHERS AND NOT TO BEAR STEARNS (FIRST DEPT))

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CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT REQUIRING INSURANCE WILL NOT BE INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE... PLAINTIFF WAS GRANTED A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THIS ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE...