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INTRODUCTION OF DEFENDANT’S TWO-YEAR-OLD FIREARM CONVICTION UNDER THE THEORY THAT DEFENDANT “OPENED THE DOOR” WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR; DEFENDANT HAD NOT QUESTIONED THE PROPRIETY OF THE POLICE CONDUCT OR THE OFFICER’S CONCLUSION THE BULGE IN DEFENDANT’S POCKET WAS A FIREARM; THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE TWO-STEP MOLINEUX ANALYSIS, WHICH DOES NOT SUPPORT INTRODUCTION OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gesmer, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the People’s introduction of evidence of defendant’s two-year-old possession of a weapon conviction was not justified under the Molineux criteria. A police officer, Lafemina, who was aware of defendant’s prior firearm conviction and a parole warrant for defendant’s arrest, saw a bulge in defendant’s pocket which Lafemina thought could have been a firearm. The defendant ran when approached by Lafemina and, during the chase, entered and exited two buildings. Because Lafemina radioed that defendant may be armed, more that 100 officers responded to the chase. Defendant was charged with burglary based upon the building-entries. No firearm was recovered:

… [O]n the erroneous theory that defendant opened the door, the trial court admitted evidence that defendant was previously convicted of second-degree attempted criminal possession of a weapon ostensibly to explain Lafemina’s actions on the day defendant was arrested. We find this was improper. The trial court should have, but failed to follow the necessary two-step Molineux test: first, determine whether the evidence is relevant to a material issue, and then, if so, whether its probative value outweighs any potential prejudice to defendant. Instead, the court improperly relied on Santana [16 AD3d 346], which does not apply here because defendant never opened the door. …

The court erred by granting the People’s application before defendant raised any issues as to the propriety of the officers’ conduct or as to the accuracy of Lafemina’s belief that defendant was armed … . People v Woody, 2023 NY Slip Op 01263, First Dept 3-14-23

Practice Point: Evidence of a prior conviction can be admitted if the defense “opens the door” to such evidence, even if the evidence would not be admissible under a Molineux analysis. Here the two-year-old firearm conviction was not admissible under Molineux and the defense did not “open the door” by questioning the propriety of the police conduct of the officer’s conclusion the bulge in defendant’s pocket indicated defendant was armed.

 

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DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO VACATE HER CONVICTION BASED... A CORPORATION (HERE A COOPERATIVE) DOES NOT OWE A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO THE SHAREHOLDERS;...