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CONTRACT FOR INTERIOR DECORATOR SERVICES AND THE PURCHASE OF FURNITURE AND ACCESSORIES WAS A SERVICE CONTRACT GOVERNED BY THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS GOVERNED BY THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, reversing Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, determined a mixed contract for interior decoration services and the purchase of furniture and other goods is governed by the six-year statute of limitations for service contracts, not the four-year statute of limitations for contracts for the purchase of goods:

In this case, the contract was primarily for interior design services, and the provision of furniture and accessories was merely incidental. Thus, the six-year statute of limitations applies. This conclusion is supported by the fact that plaintiff is an expert in the field of interior design, and it is clear from the contract that Ms. Swenson hired her for that reason. The contract, which is on plaintiff’s interior design company’s letterhead, states that plaintiff will provide advice and design suggestions regarding construction, cabinetry, painting, and using the clients’ existing items. Plaintiff stated that she designed most of the rooms throughout defendants’ Tuxedo Park house, and the contract provides that she will select products and materials, show them to Ms. Swenson, and then purchase them on her behalf. In addition, the contract provides that defendants will be charged “List price,” which plaintiff states is understood in the industry to include both the cost of the materials as well as a percentage service fee. Moreover, the contract acknowledges that certain “custom work” will be done by “interior designers work people,” and a number of the invoices referenced such “custom made” items. Finally, plaintiff and Ms. Swenson also agreed that plaintiff could use and publish photographs of the items to show off plaintiff’s work, which demonstrates that plaintiff’s value is attributed to the selection of the various items and putting them together for a particular scheme, not merely to her acting as a retailer. Hagman v Swenson, 2017 NY Slip Op 01483, 1st Dept 2-23-17

CONTRACT LAW (CONTRACT FOR INTERIOR DECORATOR SERVICES AND THE PURCHASE OF FURNITURE AND ACCESSORIES WAS A SERVICE CONTRACT GOVERNED BY THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS GOVERNED BY THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONTRACT LAW, CONTRACT FOR INTERIOR DECORATOR SERVICES AND THE PURCHASE OF FURNITURE AND ACCESSORIES WAS A SERVICE CONTRACT GOVERNED BY THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS GOVERNED BY THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)/INTERIOR DECORATORS (CONTRACT FOR INTERIOR DECORATOR SERVICES AND THE PURCHASE OF FURNITURE AND ACCESSORIES WAS A SERVICE CONTRACT GOVERNED BY THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, NOT A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS GOVERNED BY THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS)

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POSSIBLE APPLICABILITY OF THE CONSCIOUS IGNORANCE DOCTRINE PRECLUDED SUMMARY... CONTINUING WRONG DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS...