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IN THIS SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST THE PORT AUTHORITY, THE APPLICABLE STATUTE PROVIDES THAT THE NOTICE OF CLAIM MUST BE SERVED AT LEAST 60 DAYS BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION (NOT 60 DAYS AFTER THE ACCRUAL OF THE ACTION); THEREFORE THE NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS TIMELY SERVED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Maltese, determined the notice of claim in this slip and fall action against the Port Authority was timely because it was served at least 60 days before the commencement of the action. The statute of limitations for the commencement of the action had been tolled by executive order due to the COVID pandemic:

This appeal involves the intersection of McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7107, which sets forth conditions precedent for commencing an action against the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (hereinafter the Port Authority), and the executive orders issued by former Governor Andrew Cuomo which tolled time limitations due to the COVID-19 pandemic. McKinney’s Unconsolidated Laws of NY § 7107 requires that an action against the Port Authority must be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrues and that a notice of claim must be served upon the Port Authority at least 60 days before the commencement of the action. We hold that where, as here, the deadline to commence an action pursuant to section 7107 was tolled, service of the notice of claim at least 60 days prior to the timely commencement of the action satisfies section 7107. * * *

… [T]the commencement of this action on November 4, 2020, satisfied section 7107 … .

… [T]he plain language of section 7107 makes the deadline to serve a notice of claim dependent upon the date of commencement, unlike other statutes where the time to serve the notice of claim is measured from the date that the cause of action accrues … . … Therefore, the plaintiff’s service of the notice of claim on August 14, 2020, more than 60 days prior to the commencement of the action on November 4, 2020, satisfied the condition precedent set forth in section 7107. Espinal v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2023 NY Slip Op 00844, Second Dept 2-15-23

Practice Point: The statute controlling the timing of a notice of claim against the Port Authority requires service of the notice of claim at least 60 days before the commencement of the action, not 60 days after the accrual of the action.

 

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