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NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE’S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, in a matter of first impression, determined that terminating a person the employer (Fidessa) believed was married to another employee who had left to work for a competing employer stated a cause of action for discrimination based upon marital status under the New York City Human Rights Law:

The City HRL states, in relevant part: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived . . . marital status . . .(2) To refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such person or (3) To discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment” … .

From the complaint it appears that Fidessa treated plaintiff and his partner differently from [a] similarly situated couple based on its perception that they were married to one another and the members of the other couple were not. Thus, the question is whether discrimination based on “marital status” encompasses discrimination based on marital status in relation to a person relevant to Fidessa. In other words, is an employer prohibited from discharging an employee because of the employee's marriage to a particular person.

For the purposes of this analysis, the fact that defendant was not alleged to be “biased against” married couples in all circumstances is of no moment: the factor in terminating plaintiff's employment was plaintiff's marital status in relation to the employee who left the company. Thus, plaintiff's termination was based on his marital status. Morse v Fidessa Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05975, First Dept 9-6-18

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))/EMPLOYMENT LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))/MARITAL STATUS (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW PROTECTS AGAINST TERMINATION BASED UPON AN EMPLOYEE'S MARRIAGE TO A PARTICULAR PERSON WHO HAD LEFT TO WORK FOR A COMPETITOR, THERE WAS NO NEED TO ALLEGE THAT THE  EMPLOYER WAS BIASED AGAINST MARRIED COUPLES GENERALLY  (FIRST DEPT))

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