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RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a release, which purported to cover future actions in a medical malpractice suit resulting from a hospital (NSUH) admission, did not preclude a second suit that arose from a second hospital admission:

The parties settled Action No. 1 … and executed … a release that released NSUH “and all . . . related business entities . . . and all . . . employees, physicians, [and] servants, . . . from all past, present and future [*2]claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of action, wrongful death or bodily or personal injury claims . . . of any kind whatsoever, whether known or unknown, based upon any legal or equitable theory, . . . which the RELEASORS, their heirs, executors, administrators . . . hereafter can, shall, or may now have, or may hereafter accrue or otherwise be acquired, against RELEASEES for, upon, or by reason or any actual or alleged act, omission, transaction, practice, conduct, occurrence, or other matter . . . from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of this RELEASE” (hereinafter the release). * * *

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, NSUH failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the release executed by the parties settling Action No. 1 was intended to preclude the plaintiff from recovering for claims that allegedly arose during and as a result of the second admission, which were not yet in dispute at the time the release was executed … . While the plaintiff may have been aware of the incident giving rise to Action No. 2 when she signed the release, any such awareness is insufficient, itself, to establish that the release was intended to cover any potential claims which were not the subject of Action No. 1. Chiappone v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05569, Second Dept 8-1-18

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT (RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/RELEASE (RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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