You are here: / / RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM...
, ,

RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a release, which purported to cover future actions in a medical malpractice suit resulting from a hospital (NSUH) admission, did not preclude a second suit that arose from a second hospital admission:

The parties settled Action No. 1 … and executed … a release that released NSUH “and all . . . related business entities . . . and all . . . employees, physicians, [and] servants, . . . from all past, present and future [*2]claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of action, wrongful death or bodily or personal injury claims . . . of any kind whatsoever, whether known or unknown, based upon any legal or equitable theory, . . . which the RELEASORS, their heirs, executors, administrators . . . hereafter can, shall, or may now have, or may hereafter accrue or otherwise be acquired, against RELEASEES for, upon, or by reason or any actual or alleged act, omission, transaction, practice, conduct, occurrence, or other matter . . . from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of this RELEASE” (hereinafter the release). * * *

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, NSUH failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the release executed by the parties settling Action No. 1 was intended to preclude the plaintiff from recovering for claims that allegedly arose during and as a result of the second admission, which were not yet in dispute at the time the release was executed … . While the plaintiff may have been aware of the incident giving rise to Action No. 2 when she signed the release, any such awareness is insufficient, itself, to establish that the release was intended to cover any potential claims which were not the subject of Action No. 1. Chiappone v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 2018 NY Slip Op 05569, Second Dept 8-1-18

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENCE (MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/CONTRACT (RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/RELEASE (RELEASE, WHICH PURPORTED TO COVER FUTURE MALPRACTICE ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE FIRST ADMISSION TO THE HOSPITAL, DID NOT COVER A MALPRACTICE ACTION STEMMING FROM A SECOND ADMISSION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
NOXIOUS ODORS FROM A PLASTIC-MANUFACTURING FACILITY CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF A NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE THE ODORS HAVE NOT CAUSED PHYSICAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE (ECONOMIC LOSS IS NOT SUFFICIENT); THE NOXIOUS ODORS DO SUPPORT A PRIVATE NUISANCE CAUSE OF ACTION EVEN THOUGH A LARGE NUMBER OF PRIVATE CITIZENS IN THIS CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT ARE AFFECTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF RAISED QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT THE EXISTENCE OF AN AGREEMENT WITH DEFENDANT ABOUT EACH HAVING 50% OWNERSHIP OF TWO RESTAURANTS; DEFENDANT USED THE RESOURCES FROM THOSE RESTAURANTS TO OPEN A THIRD; PLAINTIFF’S CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT DID NOT MAKE THE REQUIRED FINDINGS RE: WHETHER DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AFFORDED YOUTHFUL OFFENDER STATUS; MATTER REMITTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE PRE-ANSWER MOTION TO DISMISS CERTAIN CAUSES OF ACTION BASED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; THE CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PRECLUDED BY CONTRACT PROVISIONS (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE FAILURE TO UPDATE THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE (SECOND DEPT).
REMAINDER INTERESTS WHICH CAN ONLY BE DIVESTED BY A POWER OF APPOINTMENT ARE VESTED REMAINDER INTERESTS.
PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, A PATIENT IN DEFENDANT REHAB FACILITY, FELL WHEN WALKING UNATTENDED BACK TO HIS BED FROM THE BATHROOM; PLAINTIFF ALLEGED THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A BED ALARM WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE; THAT CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE; DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION WAS PROPERLY GRANTED BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SUBMIT EXPERT EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION (WHICH WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED IF THE CAUSE OF ACTION SOUNDED IN NEGLIGENCE, AS THE MOTION COURT HAD HELD) (SECOND DEPT).
THE PURPORTED REFORMATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT TO REDUCE COVERAGE AFTER THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED IS UNENFORCEABLE, THE INSURER IS LIABLE FOR THE ORIGINAL COVERAGE AMOUNT (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CAUSES OF... EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT THE APPOINTMENT OF MOTHER AS GUARDIAN OF FRITZ, A PERSON...