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Although Plaintiff Could Not Identify the Cause of Her Fall, A Question of Fact Was Raised Re: the Cause by Circumstantial Evidence

The Second Department determined that, although the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of her fall, she was able to raise a question of fact about the cause from circumstantial evidence:

In a trip-and-fall case, a defendant may establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that the plaintiff cannot identify the cause of his or her fall … . However, that a defective or dangerous condition was the proximate cause of an accident can be established in the absence of direct evidence of causation and may be inferred from the facts and circumstances underlying the injury … .

Here, the defendants met their burden of establishing their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of her accident without engaging in speculation … . However, in opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact, inter alia, through circumstantial evidence, as to whether the cause of her fall was a cracked and/or unlevel condition on the defendants’ driveway … . Buglione v Spagnoletti, 2014 NY Slip Op 08801, 2nd Dept 12-17-14

 

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