You are here: / / REAR MOST DRIVER RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DRIVER IN...
,

REAR MOST DRIVER RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DRIVER IN FRONT STOPPED SUDDENLY AND DID NOT SIGNAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the rear-most driver (plaintiff) in this rear-end collision case raised a question of fact whether defendant stopped suddenly and did not signal:

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision … . There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident … , and a defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident … . “[N]ot every rear-end collision is the exclusive fault of the rearmost driver. The frontmost driver also has the duty not to stop suddenly or slow down without proper signaling so as to avoid a collision”… .

Here, in support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted an affidavit in which she averred that she brought her vehicle to a gradual stop to make a left turn onto … . She activated her left turning signal and had been stopped for at least 35 seconds, waiting for traffic to clear, when her vehicle was struck in the rear by the plaintiff’s vehicle. … In opposition, the plaintiff averred that the defendant made a sudden stop and failed to give proper signals, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163. The plaintiff’s affidavit was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant negligently caused or contributed to the accident … . Martinez v Allen, 2018 NY Slip Op 05462, Second Dept 7-25-18

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR MOST DRIVER RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DRIVER IN FRONT STOPPED SUDDENLY AND DID NOT SIGNAL (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS  (REAR MOST DRIVER RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DRIVER IN FRONT STOPPED SUDDENLY AND DID NOT SIGNAL (SECOND DEPT))/REAR END COLLISIONS (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, REAR MOST DRIVER RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER THE DRIVER IN FRONT STOPPED SUDDENLY AND DID NOT SIGNAL (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE SCAFFOLD FROM WHICH PLAINTIFF FELL HAD NO SAFETY RAILINGS AND THE SCAFFOLD WOBBLED AND COLLAPSED BECAUSE OF THE KICKBACK FROM A HAMMER DRILL PLAINTIFF WAS USING; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH FATHER HAD COMPLETED THE PERIOD OF INCARCERATION IMPOSED IN THIS SUPPORT ARREARS PROCEEDING, THE COMMITMENT ORDER IS APPEALABLE BECAUSE OF THE STIGMA ATTACHED TO VIOLATING SUPPORT ALLEGATIONS, ALTHOUGH THE JUDICIAL BIAS ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED, THE SECOND DEPT CONSIDERED THE ISSUE AND REVERSED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF WAS GRANTED A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN THIS ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF A REAL ESTATE PURCHASE AGREEMENT, ALTHOUGH THE AMOUNT OF THE UNDERTAKING IS WITHIN THE COURT’S DISCRETION, THE COURT MUST REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO GIVE AN UNDERTAKING (SECOND DEPT).
COMMERCIAL LIABILITY CARRIER NOT OBLIGATED TO DEFEND ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND FORECLOSURE OF MECHANIC’S LIENS, POLICY ONLY COVERS PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE AND ADVERTISING INJURY (SECOND DEPT).
CONVICTION OF ENDANGERING THE WELFARE OF A CHILD SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BASED UPON THE ACQUITTALS ON THE REMAINING 27 COUNTS OF CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT, COURT CANNOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT’S ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENT FOR AFFIRMANCE ON AN APPEAL BROUGHT BY THE PEOPLE (SECOND DEPT).
Failure to Give the Jury Instruction on Intoxication Required Reversal
THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO SEAL A CRIMINAL CONVICTION IS CIVIL IN NATURE AND CAN BE APPEALED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT; HERE THE DEFENDANT’S MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT (CSSA) WAS NOT ADEQUATELY WAIVED IN THE STIPULATION OF SETTLEMENT; THE CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF THE STIPULATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN STRUCK AND... NEGLIGENCE ACTION STEMMING FROM AN ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT SHOULD HAVE BEEN...