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CVS, A DEFENDANT IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, HAD BEEN AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL; DEFENDANT DOCTORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT CVS’S PROVIDING PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT WITH THE WRONG DOSAGE OF MEDICINE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial in this medical malpractice case, determined the jury should not have heard evidence that CVS mistakenly gave plaintiff a double dose of a drug. CVS was a defendant but successfully moved for summary judgment prior to the trial:

… [T]he Supreme Court erred in permitting the jury to hear evidence that CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (hereinafter CVS), mistakenly gave the decedent a double dose of digoxin, and testimony from [defendant] Manvar that the double dose of digoxin predisposed the decedent to an arrhythmia that caused his cardiac arrest. CVS, a defendant in this action, was awarded summary judgment based on its argument that its error in giving the decedent a double dose of digoxin was not a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s cardiac arrest. As summary judgment is the “functional equivalent” of a trial, the court should have precluded [defendants] Huppert and Manvar from presenting evidence at trial that CVS’s negligence may have been a substantial factor in causing the decedent’s cardiac arrest … . Raineri v Lalani, 2021 NY Slip Op 00890, Second Dept 2-10-21

 

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DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO DRIVING WHILE IMPAIRED BY DRUGS, NOT ALCOHOL; DIRECTION... FAILURE TO INCLUDE THE LACK OF STANDING DEFENSE IN THE ANSWER IS NO LONGER DEEMED...