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KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED ACCIDENT UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action was properly granted and defendant’s (Premier’s) motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action should have been granted. Plaintiff injured his knee carrying a heavy steel beam down some stairs. The court held that the incident was not encompassed by Labor Law 240 (1):

… [T]he plaintiff did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, since he failed to demonstrate that his injury was caused by an elevation-related hazard encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1). The plaintiff’s evidence demonstrated that the cause of his injury was the weight of the beam he was carrying. The mere fact that the plaintiff was injured by the weight of a heavy object being lifted or carried does not give rise to liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) … . The Court of Appeals has “repeatedly held, implicitly and explicitly, that it is not enough that a plaintiff’s injury flowed directly from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person, even where a device specified by the statute might have prevented the accident” … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

Premier established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action through evidence that the plaintiff was injured by the weight of the beam as opposed to an elevation-related risk … . Sullivan v New York Athletic Club of City of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 04590, Second Dept 6-20-18

​LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (KNEE INJURY CAUSED BY CARRYING A HEAVY STEEL BEAM DOWN STAIRS IS NOT A COVERED ACCIDENT UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT))

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