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GENERALLY A HOMEOWNER WHO DOES NOT DIRECT THE WORK ON THE HOME CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR A LADDER-FALL PURSUANT TO LABOR LAW 240(1); BUT THE HOMEOWNER’S EXEMPTION DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE WORK IS RELATED TO A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE; HERE THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE PROPERTY WAS TO BE USED FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the defendant property-owner in this ladder-fall case was entitled to the homeowner’s exemption from Labor Law 240(1) liability because the work related to a commercial purpose:

“Although the Labor Law generally imposes liability for worker safety on property owners and contractors, it exempts from liability ‘owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work'” ( … Labor Law §§ 240[1]; 241[6]). However, “[t]he exemption ‘was not intended to insulate from liability owners who use their one- or two-family houses purely for commercial purposes'” … . “‘[R]enovating a residence for resale or rental plainly qualifies as work being performed for a commercial purpose'” … . “Where the property serves both residential and commercial purposes, [a] determination as to whether the exemption applies in a particular case turns on the nature of the site and the purpose of the work being performed, and must be based on the owner’s intentions at the time of the injury” … .

Here, the defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether he was entitled to the homeowner’s exemption, including whether the work being performed related to a commercial purpose of the premises … and whether the defendant intended to use the premises as a three-family dwelling … .  Reyes v Rahman, 2025 NY Slip Op 06348, Second Dept 11-19-25

Practice Point: The homeowner’s exemption from Labor Law 240(1) liability does not apply where the home is used for commercial purposes.​

 

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