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BECAUSE THE INSTANT CONVICTION WAS FOR A CLASS A FELONY, SUPREME COURT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT AS A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence, noted that defendant should not have been sentenced as a second felony offender because the instant conviction was for a class A felony:

… [T]he Supreme Court was not authorized to adjudicate the defendant a second violent felony offender since the instant conviction was for a class A felony rather than a class B, C, D, or E felony (see Penal Law §§ 70.02[1]; 70.04[1][a]). Therefore, we vacate the defendant’s adjudication as a second violent felony offender. However, since the statutory sentencing parameters for a second violent felony offender do not include any specifications as to proper sentences for a class A felony because that crime is more serious than the crimes specified in those parameters, the error could not have affected the sentence imposed to the defendant’s detriment (see Penal Law § 70.04[1][a]… ). Therefore, the term of imprisonment imposed upon the defendant’s conviction of a class A felony should not be disturbed. People v Young, 2019 NY Slip Op 00152, Second Dept 1-9-19

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