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CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCarthy, over a partial dissent, took pains to explain the current law distinguishing between a nonactionable misstep from an actionable slip and fall in the context of a police officer’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits. The officer fell descending stone steps which he had used without incident a couple days before. The officer testified there was a slimy or icy substance on the step which he did not notice until after the fall. The Third Department couldn’t discern the precise grounds for the state comptroller’s denial of the benefits and sent the matter back for findings and conclusions based upon the law as explained in the opinion (which is too detailed to be fully described here):

… [T]he controlling standard for determining whether an injury was caused by an accident for purposes of the Retirement and Social Security Law remains whether the precipitating event was sudden, unexpected and not a risk of the work ordinarily performed … . In considering whether a particular petitioner has met that standard, courts should not rely on whether a condition was readily observable. Denial of benefits continues to be appropriate where the injury was caused by the employee’s misstep. Whether the employee’s inattention caused an accidental injury depends on the circumstances — i.e., was it essentially a misstep, without more, or was it based on the failure to notice something that was readily observable — and presents a factual issue. Similarly, when determining whether a precipitating event was unexpected, respondent and courts may continue to consider whether the injured person had direct knowledge of the hazard prior to the incident or whether the hazard could have been reasonably anticipated, so long as such a factual finding is based upon substantial evidence in the record. Stancarone v DiNapoli, 2018 NY Slip Op 02844, Third Dept 4-26-18

​RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS, POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/POLICE OFFICERS (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS (POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/RETIREMENT BENEFITS (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL  (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS, POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))

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