You are here: / / CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER...

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice McCarthy, over a partial dissent, took pains to explain the current law distinguishing between a nonactionable misstep from an actionable slip and fall in the context of a police officer’s application for accidental disability retirement benefits. The officer fell descending stone steps which he had used without incident a couple days before. The officer testified there was a slimy or icy substance on the step which he did not notice until after the fall. The Third Department couldn’t discern the precise grounds for the state comptroller’s denial of the benefits and sent the matter back for findings and conclusions based upon the law as explained in the opinion (which is too detailed to be fully described here):

… [T]he controlling standard for determining whether an injury was caused by an accident for purposes of the Retirement and Social Security Law remains whether the precipitating event was sudden, unexpected and not a risk of the work ordinarily performed … . In considering whether a particular petitioner has met that standard, courts should not rely on whether a condition was readily observable. Denial of benefits continues to be appropriate where the injury was caused by the employee’s misstep. Whether the employee’s inattention caused an accidental injury depends on the circumstances — i.e., was it essentially a misstep, without more, or was it based on the failure to notice something that was readily observable — and presents a factual issue. Similarly, when determining whether a precipitating event was unexpected, respondent and courts may continue to consider whether the injured person had direct knowledge of the hazard prior to the incident or whether the hazard could have been reasonably anticipated, so long as such a factual finding is based upon substantial evidence in the record. Stancarone v DiNapoli, 2018 NY Slip Op 02844, Third Dept 4-26-18

​RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS, POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/POLICE OFFICERS (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS (POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/RETIREMENT BENEFITS (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))/SLIP AND FALL  (ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS, POLICE OFFICERS, SLIP AND FALL CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A SLIP AND FALL ENTITLES A POLICE OFFICER TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER THE RETIREMENT AD SOCIAL SECURITY LAW EXPLAINED IN DEPTH, MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS UNDER THE LAW ARTICULATED IN THE OPINION (THIRD DEPT))

You might also like
Mayor Removed from Office for Unscrupulous Conduct
THE DEATH OF A PARTY TO THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION AFFECTED THE MERITS OF THE CASE; SUPREME COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE DEFENDANT’S MOTION AND THE RELATED ORDER IS A NULLITY; THE APPEAL THEREFORE MUST BE DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT).
THE DEFAULT LETTER, WHICH INDICATED THE MORTGAGE DEBT WOULD BE ACCELERATED AT A SPECIFIC FUTURE DATE IF THE DEFAULT WERE NOT CURED, DID NOT ACCELERATE THE DEBT; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT START RUNNING AND THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TIMELY (THIRD DEPT).
WHEN HER CHILDREN WERE ASLEEP, MOTHER WENT INTO THE BATHROOM, DRANK BRANDY, AND FELL ASLEEP; THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF A THREAT OF IMMINENT HARM TO THE CHILDREN OR THAT THE CHILDREN SUFFERED ANY EMOTIONAL HARM; NEGLECT FINDING REVERSED (THIRD DEPT).
PURSUANT TO THE TOWN CODE, THE PLANNING BOARD DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO INTERPRET A LOCAL ZONING LAW TO APPROVE A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT, MATTER REMITTED (THIRD DEPT).
Post-Arrest Exception to Warrant Requirement for Automobile Search Explained
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE WAS DRIVING THE EMPLOYER’S TRUCK WITH THE EMPLOYER’S PERMISSION AND WHETHER THE EMPLOYEE WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED (THIRD DEPT).
PETITIONER, A NOT-FOR-PROFIT LOCAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WAS PROPERLY FOUND TO BE SO CLOSELY AFFILIATED WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS TO MEET THE DEFINITION OF A “LOCAL AUTHORITY” SUBJECT TO THE REPORTING AND OVERSIGHT REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AUTHORITIES BUDGET OFFICE (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

VERDICT EXONERATING DEFENDANT DRIVER OF ANY COMPARATIVE FAULT IN THIS PEDESTRIAN... PRO SE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING THE DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S...