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STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS.

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined a state trooper, defendant Begeal, was entitled to summary judgment in this personal injury case because he was immune from suit for his actions, which were discretionary. Plaintiff physician assistant was injured by a patient (Lacey) brought into the hospital by law enforcement officers, including Begeal. Plaintiff was kicked by the patient and alleged Begeal negligently failed to restrain the patient’s legs:

Although Begeal had access to plastic leg restraints, the undisputed evidence established that, at the time that he left the examination room, Lacey was still handcuffed, was “extremely calm” and had allowed a nurse to remove pieces of glass from his feet without kicking or otherwise resisting the nurse’s efforts. Begeal thus made a “reasoned judgment” not to utilize the leg restraints … . Accordingly, “[t]he decision to employ [only handcuffs] was a discretionary one . . ., and [Begeal] may not be held liable for that determination” … . …

Begeal’s decision to leave the examination room to permit the medical personnel to examine Lacey in private was likewise discretionary. Although Lacey was combative when he first arrived at the hospital, Begeal did not leave the examination room until approximately 20 minutes after that time and only after ensuring that Lacey had calmed down. Based on these circumstances, Begeal “did not feel that [the hospital personnel and Feeney] were in any immediate danger” and concluded that he could safely leave the room and go to the main area in order to, among other things, wash off Lacey’s blood from his clothes. While Begeal’s judgment call proved to be incorrect, “it is not for courts to second-guess the wisdom of discretionary governmental choices, troubling though they may sometimes seem in the glaring clarity of hindsight” … . Feeney v County of Del., 2017 NY Slip Op 03583, 3rd Dept 5-4-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)/MUNICIPAL LAW (IMMUNITY, STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)/IMMUNITY (STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)/GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY (STATE TROOPER IMMUNE FROM A PERSONAL INJURY SUIT BASED UPON THE TROOPER’S DISCRETIONARY ACTS)

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DEFENDANT IN THIS CONDOMINIUM ACTION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MANDATORY FORECLOSURE... SPECIAL FUND LIABLE FOR CLAIM MADE AFTER THE 2014 CUTOFF FOR NEWLY REOPENED...