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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A RESIDENT OF THE HOME WHICH WAS DAMAGED BY FIRE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE POLICY LANGUAGE, DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSION SHE PRIMARILY RESIDED IN ANOTHER HOME TEN MINUTES AWAY 3RD DEPT.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether plaintiff was a resident of the home where the fire occurred within the meaning of the policy language. Although plaintiff had moved to a house 10 minutes away and plaintiff’s daughter lived in the damaged house, there was evidence that plaintiff never completely moved and frequented the house to care for her grandchildren:

The policy at issue defines the “insured location” as the “resident premises.” Relevant here, the term “resident premises” is defined as “[t]he one family dwelling where [the insured] reside[s].” As the party seeking to disclaim coverage, defendant bore the burden of “establishing that the exclusions or exemptions apply . . . and that they are subject to no other reasonable interpretation”… . If a term is ambiguous, it should be construed against the insurer … . * * *

In our view, it is “arguable that the reasonable expectation of the average insured” is that plaintiff’s occupancy of the premises, coupled with her claim that she never fully left the premises, was enough to permit coverage pursuant to the terms of the policy … . We do not agree that plaintiff’s evidence constituted a feigned attempt to create a question of fact … . We are mindful that she signed a statement prepared by the adjuster on the morning of the fire that destroyed the home she had built with her husband for their family. That statement confirmed that she resided [in another home], but did not deny that she also resided at the premises for purposes of insurance coverage. Craft v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 05655, 3rd Dept 7-13-17

INSURANCE LAW (QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A RESIDENT OF THE HOME WHICH WAS DAMAGED BY FIRE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE POLICY LANGUAGE, DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSION SHE PRIMARILY RESIDED IN ANOTHER HOME TEN MINUTES AWAY 3RD DEPT)/CONTRACT LAW (INSURANCE POLICY, QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS A RESIDENT OF THE HOME WHICH WAS DAMAGED BY FIRE WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE POLICY LANGUAGE, DESPITE PLAINTIFF’S ADMISSION SHE PRIMARILY RESIDED IN ANOTHER HOME TEN MINUTES AWAY 3RD DEPT)

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