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PLAINTIFF’S SON WAS INJURED WHEN A UTILITY VEHICLE DRIVEN ON PRIVATE PROPERTY BY DEFENDANTS’ 14-YEAR-OLD SON OVERTURNED, THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE VEHICLE WAS NOT BEING DRIVEN ON A PUBLIC ROAD, HOWEVER THE NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED SUMMARY JUDGMENT (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the Vehicle and Traffic Law cause of action should have been dismissed, but the negligent entrustment cause of action properly survived summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ 16-year-old son was injured when defendants’ utility vehicle, driven on private property by defendants’ 14-year-old son, overturned:

We find merit in defendants’ claim that Supreme Court erroneously concluded that the utility vehicle is not excluded under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125. Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (1), “[e]very owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle . . . by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.” For purposes of section 388, vehicle means a motor vehicle, which is defined as “[e]very vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power” … . A public highway is “[a]ny highway, road, street, avenue, alley, public place, public driveway or any other public way” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 134).

At the time of the incident, the utility vehicle was being operated on defendants’ private property — not a public highway … . Accordingly, we find that the utility vehicle was not a motor vehicle within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 125 …, and it was error for Supreme Court to conclude otherwise. …

Supreme Court did not err in denying summary judgment on the negligent entrustment cause of action. “[A] parent owes a duty to protect third parties from harm that is clearly foreseeable from the child’s improvident use or operation of a dangerous instrument, where such use is found to be subject to the parent’s control” … . …

[The] submissions reveal that [defendant] O’Leary’s son was not always required to ask for permission to operate the utility vehicle and fail to show that O’Leary had knowledge of how his son, when out of his presence, operated the vehicle. This proof, together with the clear warnings in the operator’s manual, fails to support a determination as a matter of law that defendants could not have “clearly foreseen” that their 14-year-old son’s recreational use of the utility could have exposed others to injury … . Wright v O’Leary, 2019 NY Slip Op 03424, Third Dept 5-2-19

 

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