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DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR CONDITIONAL SEALING OF THE RECORDS OF DRUG-RELATED CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO CPL 160.58 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS ALSO CONVICTED OF DWAI WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY THE SEALING STATUTE, THE SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM WHICH DEFENDANT COMPLETED MET THE JUDICIAL DIVERSION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEALING STATUTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing County Court, determined that defendant was eligible for conditional sealing of the record of his drug-related convictions pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 160.58. The fact that defendant was also convicted of Driving While Ability Impaired (DWAI), which is not an offense covered by CPL 160.58, did not preclude the sealing (as County Court had held). The Second Department rejected the argument that the shock incarceration program defendant completed was not the type of judicial diversion program contemplated by CPL 160.58:

We conclude, first, that the County Court erroneously interpreted CPL 160.58 as prohibiting sealing in light of the DWAI conviction. CPL 160.58 does not contain a “clearly expressed” limitation on a court’s authority to order sealing in cases in which a defendant pleads guilty to an accusatory instrument that contains an offense that does not qualify for sealing. Indeed, the fact that the statute refers to the sealing of an “offense” suggests that discrete offenses may be sealed even if an accusatory instrument to which a defendant pleaded guilty contained other offenses. Had the Legislature intended to limit the court’s authority as the County Court found, it could easily have specified that sealing was confined to cases in which a defendant was charged only with offenses defined in articles 220 and 221 of the Penal Law or a specified offense defined in CPL 410.91. Particularly in light of the expansive approach taken by the Court of Appeals in interpreting the DLRA [Drug Law Reform Act], the omission of a limitation on a court’s authority to seal qualifying drug offenses when coupled in an accusatory instrument with nonqualifying offenses should be interpreted as intentional … .

We further conclude that, contrary to the People’s contention, by successfully completing court-ordered Shock incarceration and further treatment during his period of PRS, the defendant successfully completed a “judicially sanctioned drug treatment program of similar duration, requirements and level of supervision” as judicial diversion and drug treatment alternative to prison. People v Parker, 2018 NY Slip Op 02487, Second Dept 4-11-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (SEALING OF RECORDS, DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR CONDITIONAL SEALING OF THE RECORDS OF DRUG-RELATED CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO CPL 160.58 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS ALSO CONVICTED OF DWAI WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY THE SEALING STATUTE, THE SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM WHICH DEFENDANT COMPLETED MET THE JUDICIAL DIVERSION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEALING STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))/CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 160.58 (SEALING OF RECORDS, DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR CONDITIONAL SEALING OF THE RECORDS OF DRUG-RELATED CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO CPL 160.58 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS ALSO CONVICTED OF DWAI WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY THE SEALING STATUTE, THE SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM WHICH DEFENDANT COMPLETED MET THE JUDICIAL DIVERSION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEALING STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))/SEALING (CRIMINAL RECORDS, DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR CONDITIONAL SEALING OF THE RECORDS OF DRUG-RELATED CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO CPL 160.58 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS ALSO CONVICTED OF DWAI WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY THE SEALING STATUTE, THE SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM WHICH DEFENDANT COMPLETED MET THE JUDICIAL DIVERSION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEALING STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))/SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM (SEALING OF CRIMINAL RECORDS, DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR CONDITIONAL SEALING OF THE RECORDS OF DRUG-RELATED CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO CPL 160.58 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS ALSO CONVICTED OF DWAI WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY THE SEALING STATUTE, THE SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM WHICH DEFENDANT COMPLETED MET THE JUDICIAL DIVERSION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEALING STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))/JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM (SEALING OF CRIMINAL RECORDS, SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM, DEFENDANT WAS ELIGIBLE FOR CONDITIONAL SEALING OF THE RECORDS OF DRUG-RELATED CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO CPL 160.58 NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HE WAS ALSO CONVICTED OF DWAI WHICH IS NOT COVERED BY THE SEALING STATUTE, THE SHOCK INCARCERATION PROGRAM WHICH DEFENDANT COMPLETED MET THE JUDICIAL DIVERSION REQUIREMENTS OF THE SEALING STATUTE (SECOND DEPT))

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