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SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the Rockland County Solid Waste Authority (Authority) was a public benefit corporation which was subject to the Public Authorities Law, not the Municipal Law. Therefore the Authority properly accepted a bid for recycling services which was not the lowest bid:

General Municipal Law § 103(1) provides that all contracts for public work involving expenditures in excess of $35,000 must be awarded to “the lowest responsible bidder.” However, that provision applies only to contracts to which “political subdivision[s] or . . . any district therein” are parties … . Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, public benefit corporations such as the Authority are ” legal entities separate from the State, enjoying an existence separate and apart from the State, its agencies and political subdivisions'” … . As such, any limitations placed on the Authority’s power to contract must come from the Authority’s enabling statute, not the General Municipal Law. The Authority’s enabling statute broadly permits it “[t]o contract with . . . persons within or without the county, for the purpose of receiving, treating and disposing of solid waste or for any other purpose authorized hereunder, including, without limitation, the power to contract with . . . persons for the delivery of all solid waste generated within a stated area to a specific solid waste management facility” … . Unlike General Municipal Law § 103, the Authority’s enabling statute does not require contracts such as the one at issue here to be awarded to the “lowest responsible bidder.” Thus, the petitioner’s contention that the Authority acted beyond its grant of power is without merit. Matter of AAA Carting & Rubbish Removal, Inc. v Town of Stony Point, N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 02203, Second Dept 3-28-18

MUNICIPAL LAW (BIDS FOR SERVICES, SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT))/PUBIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS  (BIDS FOR SERVICES, SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (PUBLIC BENEFIT CORPORATIONS, BIDS FOR SERVICES, SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT))/PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW (BIDS FOR SERVICES, SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT))/SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY (BIDS FOR SERVICES, SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT))/RECYCLING  (BIDS FOR SERVICES, SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT))/BIDS (SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY, BIDS FOR SERVICES, SOLID WASTE AUTHORITY IS SUBJECT TO THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW, NOT THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW, THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BID FOR RECYCLING SERVICES (SECOND DEPT))

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