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PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff’s twice filing for bankruptcy tolled the statute of limitations for the foreclosure action, making the foreclosure action timely. Therefore, the bank’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1501 action to cancel and discharge the mortgage was properly granted:

Section 362 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code (11 USC) provides that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title” … . The filing of a petition for protection under the Bankruptcy Code imposes “an automatic stay of any mortgage foreclosure actions” … . CPLR 204(a) provides that “[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed . . . by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced.” Pursuant to CPLR 204(a), the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay tolls the limitations period for foreclosure actions … .

Here, in support of its motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), U.S. Bank submitted copies of the plaintiff’s petitions filed in the Bankruptcy Court, together with copies of the orders dismissing the first bankruptcy proceeding and releasing the subject property from the bankruptcy estate in the second bankruptcy proceeding, thereby establishing that, pursuant to CPLR 204(a), the statute of limitations had been tolled for over 4½ years. Lubonty v U.S. Bank N.A., 2018 NY Slip Op 02153, Second Dept 3-28-18

FORECLOSURE (PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/BANKRUPTCY (FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FORECLOSURE, PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FORECLOSURE, BANKRUPTCY, PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 204 (FORECLOSURE, BANKRUPTCY, PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW (RPAPL) (FORECLOSURE, RPAPL 1501 ACTION TO CANCEL AND DISCHARGE MORTGAGE, PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR OVER FOUR YEARS, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIMELY (SECOND DEPT))

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