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FAMILY COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING THE REQUEST FOR AN ADJOURNMENT IN CONTEMPLATION OF DISMISSAL IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined Family Court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s request for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal in this juvenile delinquency proceeding:

The Family Court has broad discretion in determining whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal … . Although, as it is often stated, a respondent is not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his or her “first brush with the law” … , a respondent’s criminal and disciplinary history is nevertheless relevant to a court’s discretionary determination of whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal … . Other relevant factors include, but are not necessarily limited to, a respondent’s history of drug or alcohol use … , a respondent’s association with gang activity … , a respondent’s academic and school attendance record … , the nature of the underlying incident … , a respondent’s decision to accept responsibility for his or her actions … , any recommendations made in a probation or mental health report … , the degree to which the respondent’s parent or guardian is involved in the respondent’s home and academic life … , and the ability of the respondent’s parent or guardian to provide adequate supervision … .

Here, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant’s application pursuant to Family Court Act § 315.3(1) for an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal. This proceeding constituted the appellant’s first contact with the court system, the appellant took responsibility for his actions, and the record demonstrates that he had learned from his mistakes. Matter of Brian M., 2020 NY Slip Op 03785, Second Dept 7-8-20

 

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