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ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TOLLED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS WERE ACTIVE, IT WAS NOT TOLLED WHEN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN EFFECT, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the statute of limitations for bringing a foreclosure action, although tolled when bankruptcy proceedings were active, was not tolled when a temporary restraining order prohibiting the sale of the property was in effect. Therefore the foreclosure action was time-barred:

Under CPLR 204(a), “[w]here the commencement of an action has been stayed by a court or by statutory prohibition, the duration of the stay is not a part of the time within which the action must be commenced” … . The bankruptcy stay of 11 USC § 362(c) operates under CPLR 204(a) to stay the commencement, or continuation, of a foreclosure action … . Thus, the periods during which bankruptcy stays were in effect were not part of the time counted in the calculation of the running of the statute of limitations … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, however, the time during which the temporary restraining order was in effect when the [borrowers] moved to dismiss the first foreclosure action did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. That order prevented the plaintiff from selling the property at auction, but only in the context of the first foreclosure action. The temporary restraining order did not prevent the plaintiff from discontinuing the first foreclosure action and commencing a new action… . Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled under CPLR 204(a) to have the time during which the temporary restraining order was in effect excluded from the statute of limitations, and the total time elapsed from the acceleration of the mortgage debt until the second foreclosure action was commenced exceeded six years, even when the periods attributable to the bankruptcy stays are excluded. U.S. Bank N.A. v Joseph, 2018 NY Slip Op 02155, Second Dept 3-28-18

FORECLOSURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TOLLED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS WERE ACTIVE, IT WAS NOT TOLLED WHEN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN EFFECT, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT))/BANKRUPTCY (FORECLOSURE, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TOLLED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS WERE ACTIVE, IT WAS NOT TOLLED WHEN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN EFFECT, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FORECLOSURE, ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TOLLED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS WERE ACTIVE, IT WAS NOT TOLLED WHEN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN EFFECT, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 204 (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, FORECLOSURE, ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TOLLED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS WERE ACTIVE, IT WAS NOT TOLLED WHEN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN EFFECT, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT))/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (FORECLOSURE, ALTHOUGH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR THE FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS TOLLED WHEN THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS WERE ACTIVE, IT WAS NOT TOLLED WHEN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PROHIBITING SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS IN EFFECT, FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT))

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PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE NYC HUMAN... PLAINTIFF’S TWICE FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS...