You are here: / / FAMILY COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TWO CHILDREN...
,

FAMILY COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE TWO CHILDREN IN ITS PLACEMENT DECISION; STRONG TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over an extensive two-justice dissent, determined Family Court properly considered the best interests of two children in deciding where the children should be place. The dissent disagreed. The decision is too detailed and fact-specific to fairly summarize here:

At its essence, this appeal presents a circumstance where everyone involved—the foster mother, the godmother, the attorney for the child, ACS, and the Family Court—agreed that the child and his half-sibling should be kept together. The court found that both the godmother’s home and the foster mother’s home were entirely suitable, but in choosing between the two, properly noted that the half-sibling’s father did not consent to the half-sibling being placed anywhere except with the godmother. The court’s consideration of that fact did not mean that the child’s best interests were not globally considered, but was instead a relevant and necessary fact that the court needed to take into account in determining how to best promote the child’s best interests and the obvious benefit to him of keeping the two half-siblings together as each other’s sole living, known, biological relatives. It was not error for the court to do so, and in fact, the court would have been derelict in its duties had it failed to do so. Matter of Adonnis M. (Kenyetta M.), 2021 NY Slip Op 03322, Second Dept 5-26-21

 

You might also like
Failure to Cooperate with Probation Department Is Valid Reason for Enhanced Sentence
VILLAGE CODE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MAKE ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNERS LIABLE IN TORT FOR FAILING TO MAINTAIN A SIDEWALK; SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO PLAINTIFF.
DISAGREEING WITH THE FIRST DEPARTMENT, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD THAT DAMAGES FOR “PRE-IMPACT TERROR” ARE NOT APPROPRIATE IN A MED MAL CASE; HERE PLAINTIFF SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK IN 2008 AND DIED IN 2011 (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH NO OBJECTIONS WERE MADE TO THE PROSECUTOR’S NUMEROUS INAPPROPRIATE REMARKS, THE APPEAL WAS CONSIDERED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND A NEW TRIAL WAS ORDERED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE BREACH OF CONTRACT CAUSES OF ACTION WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS NOT AMBIGUOUS AND PAROL EVIDENCE THEREFORE WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE; THE FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT CAUSE OF ACTION, FOR WHICH PAROL EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF, WHO HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, DID NOT DEMONSTRATE FREEDOM FROM COMPARATIVE FAULT IN THIS BUS-CAR COLLISION CASE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
Proper Jury Instructions in False Imprisonment Case Based Upon Detention During the Execution of a Search Warrant Explained
“Anders” Brief Rejected

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED THE PARTIES TO EQUALLY SHARE THE COSTS... THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DEFENDANT KNEW THE COMPLAINANT WAS A 14-YEAR-OLD RUNAWAY...