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UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DEFENDANT PROVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing defendant’s murder conviction after a weight of the evidence analysis, over a dissent, determined that defendant had proved the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect by the preponderance of the evidence:

… [W]e conclude that the jury was not justified in finding that the preponderance of the evidence failed to establish that the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciate that his conduct was wrong at the time that he possessed the loaded firearm and shot Wright. The undisputed trial evidence established that at the relevant time, the defendant was suffering from auditory hallucinations, paranoia, and “incorrect perceptions” of reality. The opinion of the People’s expert psychologist that the defendant did not suffer a schizoaffective disorder, notwithstanding such a diagnosis by the defendant’s treating psychiatrists over the past three years, was conclusory. Moreover, the psychologist’s alternative theory that the defendant’s hallucinations were due to his use of PCP were purely speculative and without adequate evidentiary support. The psychologist’s conclusion that the defendant was motivated by revenge against a person he mistakenly perceived to have stolen his shorts was also speculative and contrary to the credible evidence presented. We accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor … , and weigh conflicting expert evidence … . However, on this record, the rational inferences which can be drawn from the evidence presented at trial do not support the conviction. People v Spratley, 2018 NY Slip Op 01488, Second Dept 3-7-18

CRIMINAL LAW (MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DEFENDANT PROVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DEFENDANT PROVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DEFENDANT PROVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT)/WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, APPEALS, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DEFENDANT PROVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT (CRIMINAL LAW, UNDER A WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ANALYSIS, DEFENDANT PROVED THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT, MURDER CONVICTION REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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