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FAMILY COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE SUMMARILY DISMISSED MOTHER’S PETITION FOR CUSTODY OF CHILDREN LIVING OUT-OF-STATE WITHOUT FIRST DETERMINING WHETHER IT HAD EXCLUSIVE, CONTINUING JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY ISSUES (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Family Court should not have dismissed mother’s petition seeking sole custody of the children, who lived out-of-state, without first making a ruling on whether it had continuing jurisdiction over custody issues:

On November 22, 2016, the Family Court issued an order (hereinafter the custody order) awarding, inter alia, joint legal custody of the subject children to the mother and the children’s godmother, with primary physical custody and final decision-making authority to the godmother. …

Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, codified in article 5-A of the Domestic Relations Law, a court in this State which has made an initial custody determination has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over that determination until it finds, as is relevant here, that it should relinquish jurisdiction because the child does not have a “significant connection” with New York, and “substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships” (Domestic Relations Law § 76-a[1][a] …). …

… Family Court should not have summarily dismissed the mother’s petition on the ground that the children had been living with the godmother in Pennsylvania, without considering whether it had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 76-a (1) … , and affording the mother an opportunity to present evidence as to that issue … . Matter of Hodge v Hodges-Nelson, 2020 NY Slip Op 02926, Second Dept 5-20-20

 

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