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WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL INVALID (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal was not valid:

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… [T]he record of the plea proceeding did not demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal. The Supreme Court, after inquiring of counsel whether the defendant had executed a written waiver, advised the defendant: “[Y]ou have just executed the waiver of appeal. And by doing so, you have given up your right to appeal, which means there will be no appeal with regards to anything in your case.” Instead of ascertaining whether the defendant had made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent choice to waive his right to appeal as a condition of his plea, the court merely informed the defendant that he had already waived his right to appeal by executing the appeal waiver and then confirmed that the defendant understood this established fact. “[A] defendant does not validly waive his or her right to appeal where the colloquy suggests that waiving the right to appeal [is] mandatory rather than a right which the defendant [is] being asked to voluntarily relinquish'” … . Moreover, the court failed to establish on the record that the defendant read and understood the written waiver, or discussed the waiver with his counsel … . People v Johnson, 2018 NY Slip Op 00567, Second Dept 1-31-18

CRIMINAL LAW (APPEALS, WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL INVALID (SECOND DEPT))/APPEALS (CRIMINAL LAW, WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL INVALID (SECOND DEPT))/WAIVER (RIGHT TO APPEAL, CRIMINAL LAW WAIVER OF RIGHT TO APPEAL INVALID (SECOND DEPT))

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