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THE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE TRIALS OF TWO ACTIONS STEMMING FROM THE SAME FIRE, WHERE ONE PARTY WAS BOTH A DEFENDANT AND A PLAINTIFF, SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; ANY PREJUDICE RESULTING FROM THE JURY’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE (ONE OF THE ACTIONS IS AGAINST AN INSURER) CAN BE HANDLED WITH JURY INSTRUCTIONS (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the motion to consolidate the trials of two actions stemming from the same fire which damages two adjoining properties should have been granted. The court noted that one party is both a plaintiff and a defendant:

Although a motion pursuant to CPLR 602(a) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court … , consolidation or joinder for trial is favored to avoid unnecessary duplication of trials, save unnecessary costs and expense, and prevent an injustice which would result from divergent decisions based on the same facts … . “Where common questions of law or fact exist, a motion [pursuant to CPLR 602(a)] to consolidate [or for a joint trial] should be granted, absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right by the party opposing the motion” … .

Here … the two actions involve common questions of law and fact. Assuming, arguendo, that the respondents would be prejudiced if the two actions are tried before the same jury since it would bring to the jury’s attention the existence of insurance … , any such prejudice is outweighed by the possibility of inconsistent verdicts if separate trials ensue … . Furthermore, the possibility of such prejudice can be mitigated by appropriate jury instructions … . Moreover, a joint trial, rather than consolidation, is appropriate where a party is both a plaintiff and a defendant … . Calle v 2118 Flatbush Ave. Realty, LLC, 2022 NY Slip Op 05981, Second Dept 10-26-22

Practice Point: Here the motion pursuant to CPLR 602 to consolidate the trials of two actions stemming from the same fire should have been granted. One party was both a defendant and a plaintiff. The fact that consolidation would bring the existence of insurance to the jury’s attention (one of the parties is an insurer), although prejudicial, can be handled by jury instructions.

 

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