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FURTIVE MOVEMENTS JUSTIFIED POLICE OFFICER’S LIMITED SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR, USE OF BANK CARD READER ON CARDS IN DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION DID NOT REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, affirming defendant’s conviction, held that defendant’s furtive movements inside a car justified the police officer’s fear that defendant may have had a weapon, and the use of a bank card reader to see if the information on the magnetic strips of defendant’s cards matched the information on the front of the cards did not require a search warrant:

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Upon the officers’ approach to his car, defendant’s “furtive motion[] in attempting to stuff something under the passenger seat . . . caused the officer to reasonably fear for his safety and reasonably believe that defendant might possess a weapon” … . The officers were thus justified in directing defendant to show his hands and get out of the car, and in performing a limited search of the area where defendant appeared to have hidden something … . The search revealed contraband, providing probable cause for defendant’s arrest … . …

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Defendant’s final suppression argument is that when the police used a bank card reader to determine whether the account information contained in the magnetic strips of the cards recovered from defendant’s wallet matched the information printed on the front of the cards, this action was similar to a cell phone search, and it thus required a search warrant under Riley v California (573 US , 134 S Ct 2473 [2014]). However, a growing number of cases addressing this technology recognize that this type of police action does not violate any privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment … . People v Sankara, 2018 NY Slip Op 00224, First Dept 1-11-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SEARCH AND SEIZURE, FURTIVE MOVEMENTS JUSTIFIED POLICE OFFICER’S LIMITED SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR, USE OF BANK CARD READER ON CARDS IN DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION DID NOT REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT (FIRST DEPT))/SEARCH AND SEIZURE (CRIMINAL LAW,  FURTIVE MOVEMENTS JUSTIFIED POLICE OFFICER’S LIMITED SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR, USE OF BANK CARD READER ON CARDS IN DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION DID NOT REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT (FIRST DEPT))/FURTIVE MOVEMENTS (CRIMINAL LAW, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, FURTIVE MOVEMENTS JUSTIFIED POLICE OFFICER’S LIMITED SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR, USE OF BANK CARD READER ON CARDS IN DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION DID NOT REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT (FIRST DEPT))/BANK CARD READER (CRIMINAL LAW, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, FURTIVE MOVEMENTS JUSTIFIED POLICE OFFICER’S LIMITED SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR, USE OF BANK CARD READER ON CARDS IN DEFENDANT’S POSSESSION DID NOT REQUIRE A SEARCH WARRANT (FIRST DEPT))

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