You are here: / / AMONG SEVERAL LABOR LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND INSURANCE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS...

AMONG SEVERAL LABOR LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND INSURANCE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION, THE 2ND DEPT DETERMINED SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN ITS LABOR LAW 200 ANALYSIS (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department affirmed and reversed several rulings on defendants’ motions for summary judgment in this Labor Law 240 (1), 241 (6), 200, and common law negligence action. Plaintiff was injured when he slipped on a loose piece of sprinkler pipe on property owned by defendant One City. The 2nd Department determined the correct standard for analyzing the Labor 200 cause of action was under the dangerous condition prong, rather than the manner of work prong, of Labor Law 200 and dismissed that cause of action. There was no proof One City created or knew about the dangerous condition. The Labor Law 241 (6) cause of action properly survived summary judgment because there was a question of fact whether the fall occurred in a passageway that should be kept clear and there was a question fact whether plaintiff was cleaning up the area at the time (which would preclude suit). The 2nd Department further found that there was a question of fact whether another defendant had purchased insurance as required by a contract with One City. The court also addressed indemnification issues. With regard to the Labor Law 200 and common law negligence causes of action, the court wrote:

​

Section 200 of the Labor Law is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work … . “Claims for personal injury under the statute and the common law fall into two broad categories: those arising from an alleged defect or dangerous condition existing on the premises and those arising from the manner in which the work was performed” … .”Where the injury was caused by the manner and means of the work, including the equipment used, the owner or general contractor is liable if it actually exercised supervisory control over the injury-producing work” … . “Where an existing defect or dangerous condition caused the injury, liability attaches if the owner or general contractor created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of it” … .

Here, the court finds that the appropriate standard to apply in this case is the dangerous condition standard and not the manner and means standard. The cause of the accident, the piece of loose pipe, was not a condition created by the manner in which the work was performed by plaintiff or his employer but was rather a condition that already existed prior to plaintiff’s arrival on the fifth floor that day.  Prevost v One City Block LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08303, First Dept 11-28-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (AMONG SEVERAL LABOR LAW, NEGLIGENCE AND INSURANCE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION, THE 2ND DEPARTMENT DETERMINED SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD IN ITS LABOR LAW 200 ANALYSIS (FIRST DEPT))

You might also like
PLAINTIFF, UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW, SUFFICIENTLY PLED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENDANT BANK GIVING RISE TO A DUTY TO ENFORCE ITS ANTI-FRAUD PROCEDURES; PLAINTIFF WIRED $300,000 TO AN ACCOUNT WHICH HAD BEEN SET UP TO DEFRAUD PLAINTIFF (FIRST DEPT).
DISAGREEING WITH THE THIRD DEPARTMENT, THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HELD THAT A PREHEARING DENIAL OF AN APPLICATION FOR RESENTENCING UNDER THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS JUSTICE ACT (DVSJA) IS APPEALABLE; HERE DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A SUFFICIENT NEXUS BETWEEN THE ABUSE HE SUFFERED WHILE LIVING WITH HIS FAMILY AND THE STABBING OF A STRANGER AFTER HE HAD LEFT HOME (FIRST DEPT).
THE EXAMINATION UNDER OATH (EUO) WAS SCHEDULED BEFORE THE INSURER RECEIVED A CLAIM FORM; THEREFORE THE INSURER DID NOT HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF 11 NYCRR 65-3.5 TO BE ENTITLED TO A DEFAULT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT; THE UNDERLYING TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WAS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN STAGED AND CLAIMANT FAILED TO APPEAR AT SCHEDULED EOU’S (FIRST DEPT).
The Insurer Properly Reserved Its Rights to Disclaim Coverage When It Agreed to Defend a Legal Malpractice Action
FAMILY COURT ACT SECTION 1028 REQUIRES THAT THE COURT EXPEDITE A HEARING ON MOTHER’S PETITION TO HAVE HER CHILDREN RETURNED TO HER; HERE THE HEARING WAS STARTED WITHIN THREE DAYS OF THE APPLICATION AS REQUIRED BUT WAS THEREAFTER ADJOURNED SEVERAL TIMES OVER A PERIOD OF MONTHS, A VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE (FIRST DEPT).
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, BASED UPON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE QUI TAM ACTION ALLEGING THE VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK FALSE CLAIMS ACT BY SETTING INTEREST RATES ON BONDS PROPERLY DENIED (FIRST DEPT). ​
DEFENDANT’S FLIGHT WHEN APPROACHED BY POLICE IN PLAINCLOTHES AND DRIVING AN UNMARKED CAR DID NOT JUSTIFY PURSUIT, MOTION TO SUPPRESS WEAPON DISCARDED BY THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED,... DENIAL OF PAROLEE’S REQUEST TO LIVE IN HIS FAMILY HOME WAS APPARENTLY...