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TENANT DID NOT COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDINGS, TENANT’S BRINGING A PLENARY ACTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING THE EVICTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CLAIM SPLITTING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice DeMoyer, refusing to follow the 1st Department, determined the tenant, who was a defendant in a failed eviction action, had the right to bring a plenary action to recover attorney’s fees without violating the prohibition against claim splitting. It is significant that the tenant did not counterclaim for attorney’s fees in the answer to the eviction action. The fact that the answer included a boilerplate request for attorney’s fees in the wherefore clause did not amount to a counterclaim (which is authorized by Real Property Law § 234:

Applying the traditional understanding of the claim splitting rule discussed above and embodied in the landlord-tenant case law, the landlord’s bid for dismissal on claim splitting grounds must fail. It was the landlord, not the tenant, who instituted the two prior proceedings in Village Court. The tenant successfully defended herself against the landlord’s claims, but she did not assert an affirmative claim until the instant plenary action. Indeed, the landlord’s appellate brief explicitly concedes that the tenant did not interpose a Real Property Law § 234 counterclaim for attorneys’ fees in either of the two prior proceedings. Thus, because the instant action is the tenant’s first assertion of an affirmative claim for relief under section 234, the claim splitting rule poses no bar to her recovery. Put simply, the tenant cannot be guilty of claim splitting because, until the instant action, there was no claim to split. Caracaus v Conifer Cent. Sq. Assoc., 2017 NY Slip Op 08946, Fourth Dept 12-22-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (CLAIM SPLITTING, TENANT DID NOT COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDINGS, TENANT’S BRINGING A PLENARY ACTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING THE EVICTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CLAIM SPLITTING (FOURTH DEPT))/LANDLORD-TENANT (EVICTION, ATTORNEY’S FEES, TENANT DID NOT COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDINGS, TENANT’S BRINGING A PLENARY ACTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING THE EVICTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CLAIM SPLITTING (FOURTH DEPT))/REAL PROPERTY LAW (LANDLORD-TENANT, ATTORNEY’S FEES, TENANT DID NOT COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDINGS, TENANT’S BRINGING A PLENARY ACTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING THE EVICTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CLAIM SPLITTING (FOURTH DEPT))/CLAIM SPLITTING  (LANDLORD-TENANT, ATTORNEY’S FEES, TENANT DID NOT COUNTERCLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE EVICTION PROCEEDINGS, TENANT’S BRINGING A PLENARY ACTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AFTER SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING THE EVICTION DID NOT VIOLATE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST CLAIM SPLITTING (FOURTH DEPT))

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