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AN ATTEMPT TO SERVE WALTER WITKOWSKI JR AT THE ADDRESS OF WALTER WITKOWSKI SR DID NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF INTENDED TO SERVE JUNIOR, SERVICE UPON JUNIOR WITHIN THE 120 DAY SERVICE PERIOD, BUT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, WAS VALID (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice DeMoyer, reversing Supreme Court, determined Walter Witkowski, Jr., not Walter Witkowski, Sr., was the party plaintiff intended to serve in this traffic accident case. An attempt to serve was made at senior’s house within the statute of limitations. Before the expiration of the 120 day service period, but after the expiration of the statute of limitations, junior was served at the correct address:

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CPLR 306-b requires service of the summons and complaint upon the defendant—i.e., Junior and only Junior—”within [120] days after the commencement of the action.” And that is precisely what occurred here. Junior freely concedes that he was served with the summons and complaint in November 2013, well within the statutory deadline for effecting service (which would have expired in February 2014). Moreover, there is no dispute that the November 2013 service constituted good and valid service under CPLR 308 (2). Junior—the only defendant in the case—was thus properly served … .

True, it took plaintiff two separate tries to properly serve Junior. As noted above, plaintiff’s first attempt at serving Junior in October 2013 was admittedly defective under CPLR 308 (2) because the commencement papers were delivered to an address where Junior did not reside (i.e., Senior’s house). But this is inconsequential. Plaintiff cured his defective service by effecting unquestionably proper service within 120 days of commencement, and it is black letter law that “plaintiff had the absolute statutory right to effect valid service at any point within the 120-day period [afforded by CPLR 306-b]” … .Service, after all, is not a “one strike and you’re out” game. Martin v Witkowski, 2017 NY Slip Op 09014, Fourth Dept 12-22-17

CIVIL PROCEDURE (AN ATTEMPT TO SERVE WALTER WITKOWSKI JR AT THE ADDRESS OF WALTER WITKOWSKI SR DID NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF INTENDED TO SERVE JUNIOR, SERVICE UPON JUNIOR WITHIN THE 120 DAY SERVICE PERIOD, BUT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, WAS VALID (FOURTH DEPT))/SERVICE OF PROCESS (AN ATTEMPT TO SERVE WALTER WITKOWSKI JR AT THE ADDRESS OF WALTER WITKOWSKI SR DID NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF INTENDED TO SERVE JUNIOR, SERVICE UPON JUNIOR WITHIN THE 120 DAY SERVICE PERIOD, BUT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, WAS VALID (FOURTH DEPT))/NAMES (SERVICE OF PROCESS, FATHER SON WITH SAME NAME, AN ATTEMPT TO SERVE WALTER WITKOWSKI JR AT THE ADDRESS OF WALTER WITKOWSKI SR DID NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF INTENDED TO SERVE JUNIOR, SERVICE UPON JUNIOR WITHIN THE 120 DAY SERVICE PERIOD, BUT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, WAS VALID (FOURTH DEPT))/CPLR 306-b  (AN ATTEMPT TO SERVE WALTER WITKOWSKI JR AT THE ADDRESS OF WALTER WITKOWSKI SR DID NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFF INTENDED TO SERVE JUNIOR, SERVICE UPON JUNIOR WITHIN THE 120 DAY SERVICE PERIOD, BUT AFTER THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN, WAS VALID (FOURTH DEPT))

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