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TRESPASS AND NUISANCE ACTIONS BASED UPON WATER RUNOFF FROM NEIGHBORING PROPERTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiffs’ trespass and nuisance actions based upon water run-off from neighboring property should not have been dismissed:

It is well-settled that “[l]andowners making improvements to their land are not liable for damage caused by any resulting flow of surface water onto abutting property as long as the improvements are made in a good faith effort to enhance the usefulness of the property and no artificial means, such as pipes and drains, are used to divert the water thereon” … . The diversion of water by artificial means, however, is not strictly limited to the use of pipes, drains and ditches and may otherwise be established where it is demonstrated that the net effect of defendants’ improvements “so changed, channeled or increased the flow of surface water onto [the] plaintiff[s]’ land as to proximately cause damage[] to the property”  … . …

Based on the … competing affidavits, we find that there are triable issues of fact as to whether defendants’ improvements to the subject parcels diverted surface water onto plaintiffs’ property by artificial means … , were made in bad faith or otherwise altered the elevation and grade of the Town Homes’ parcel with the express purpose of diverting water onto plaintiffs’ property … . …

Additionally, plaintiffs were not required to prove an intentional intrusion or intentional interference with their right to use and enjoy the property in order to sustain their private nuisance claim — such a claim being actionable upon proof that defendants’ invasion was either intentional, negligent or reckless, or otherwise involved abnormally dangerous activities … .. Further, to the extent that plaintiffs’ nuisance cause of action relies entirely on proof of defendants’ allegedly negligent conduct, the nuisance and negligence claims are essentially duplicative of one another and, therefore, Supreme Court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ negligence claim was appropriate under the circumstances … . 517 Union St. Assoc. LLC v Town Homes of Union Sq. LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 08925, Third Dept 12-21-17

REAL PROPERTY (TRESPASS AND NUISANCE ACTIONS BASED UPON WATER RUNOFF FROM NEIGHBORING PROPERTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))/TRESPASS (TRESPASS AND NUISANCE ACTIONS BASED UPON WATER RUNOFF FROM NEIGHBORING PROPERTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))/NUISANCE  (TRESPASS AND NUISANCE ACTIONS BASED UPON WATER RUNOFF FROM NEIGHBORING PROPERTY SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED (THIRD DEPT))

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